Kenneth P. Jacobus, Esq.
KENNETH P. JACOBUS, P.C.
310 K Street, Suite 200
Anchorage, AK 99501-2064
(907) 277-3333
(907) 250-1589 (cellular)
(907) 264-6666 (fax)
jacobuskenneth@gmail.com

Attorney for all Plaintiffs

FILED in the TRIAL COURTS
STATE OF ALASKA, THIRD DISTRICT

MAY 18 2021

Clerk of the Trial Courts
By _____ Deputy

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT FOR THE STATE OF ALASKA

THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT AT ANCHORAGE

SCOTT A. KOHLHAAS, THE ALASKAN INDEPENDENCE PARTY, ROBERT M. BIRD, and KENNETH P. JACOBUS,

Plaintiffs,

vs.

STATE OF ALASKA; STATE OF ALASKA; DIVISION OF ELECTIONS; LIEUTENANT GOVERNOR KEVIN MEYER, in his official capacity as Supervisor of Elections; and GAIL FENUMIAI, in her official capacity of Director of the Division of Elections;

Defendants.

Case No. 3AN-20-09532 CI

EXHIBIT LIST FOR JOINT OPPOSITION TO MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT OF THE STATE OF ALASKA AND ALASKANS FOR BETTER ELECTIONS AND CROSS-MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT.

Scott A. Kohlhaas, the Alaskan Independence Party, Robert M. Bird, and Kenneth P. Jacobus, plaintiffs, hereby submit this Exhibit List and attached exhibits as referenced in their opposition to the motions for summary judgment of the State of Alaska and Alaskans for Better Elections and cross-motion for Summary Judgment:

Exhibit A - Anchorage Daily News Article (4 pages)

LAW OFFICES OF
KENNETH P. JACOBUS
A PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION
310 K Street, Suite 200
ANCHORAGE AK 99501-2064
TELEPHONE (907) 277-3333

Exhibit B - Anchorage Press Article, "Too Cute By Half," April 8, 2021, (2 pages)

Exhibit C - Nathaniel Rakish, "California Voters Should Start Preparing for a Recall Election, May 4, 2021 (4 pages)

Exhibit D - Wikepedia, "2003 California Gubernatorial Recall Election" (19 pages)

Exhibit E - Wikepedia, "Political Party" (27 pages)

Exhibit F - Wikepedia, "Nonpartisan Blanket Primary (13 pages)

Exhibit G - Ballot Language for Ballot Measure No. 2, for 2020 election (1 page)

Exhibit H - Alaska Republican Party Rule, Article 1, Section 10 (1 page)

Exhibit I - Wikepedia, "Ranked Voting" (17 pages)

Exhibit J - Alaska Automatic Runoff Voting Initiative, Measure 1 (August 2002) (2 pages)

Exhibit K - Borough Leaders Vote Down Ranked Choice Voting (1 page)

Exhibit L - House Bill No. 174, Introduced April 4, 2021 (1 page)

DATED this 17th day of May, 2021.

KENNETH P. JACOBUS, P.C.
Attorney for Plaintiffs

By _____
Kenneth P. Jacobus

LAW OFFICES OF
KENNETH P. JACOBUS
A PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION
310 K Street, Suite 200
ANCHORAGE AK 99501-2064
TELEPHONE (907) 277-3333

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on this 17th day of May, 2021, copies of this Exhibit List and Exhibits A through J were emailed to:

This list and the Exhibits will be hand delivered to the Court, because of the size of the document.

Margaret Paton-Walsh
Office of the Attorney General
1031 West Fourth Avenue, Suite 200
Anchorage AK 99501
margaret.paton-walsh@alaska.gov

Thomas S. Flynn
Office of the Attorney General
1031 West Fourth Avenue, Suite 200
Anchorage AK 99501
thomas.flynn@alaska.gov

Scott Kendall
Samuel Gottstein
Jahna Lindemuth
Holmes, Weddle and Barcott, P.C.
701 West 8th Avenue, Suite 700
Anchorage AK 99501
smkendall@hwb-law.com

Kenneth P. Jacobus


LAW OFFICES OF
KENNETH P. JACOBUS
A PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION
310 K Street, Suite 200
ANCHORAGE AK 99501-2064
TELEPHONE (907) 277-3333

ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS

Politics

Democrats and Republicans stay quiet as lone legal challenge advances against Alaska's new ranked-choice voting system

Author: James Brooks Updated: 1 day ago Published 1 day ago



Voters file through the early voting site at Anchorage's Midtown Mall Monday, October 19, 2020. (Marc Lester / ADN)

When Maine's pioneering attempt to install ranked-choice voting was met with a flurry of lawsuits, Alaskans expected the same thing after voters here approved a sweeping election-reform law in November.

So far, that hasn't happened. Only a single lawsuit has been filed in state court to block implementation of the state's new election system, approved as Ballot Measure 2, and no challenges have been filed in federal court.

Alaska's first election under the ne system is more than a year away, but on. andidate has already begun a campaign to challenge incumbent U.S. Sen. Lisa Murkowski. Until that lawsuit is resolved, voters and candidates won't know the rules for the state's election.

The state's Republican and Democratic parties have stayed out of the legal fight, and experts suggest that internal party politics and the expense of a lawsuit have kept them away. The lone case was brought by the chairman of the Alaskan Independence Party and a Libertarian candidate for the state Legislature.

"I would have expected by now to pick up two, three, four, well-financed parties attacking this thing. And you can see, and I can see, it hasn't happened," said Scott Kendall, an attorney who wrote the measure and is now defending it in court.

"I was totally surprised," said Anchorage attorney Ken Jacobus, who is representing the plaintiffs and has argued that parts of the measure conflict with the Alaska Constitution.

In a request for summary judgment, he said Ballot Measure 2's ranked-choice system for electing the governor and lieutenant governor amounts to a runoff election. That's illegal, he argues, because the plain text of the constitution says that "the candidate receiving the greatest number of votes shall be governor."

Jacobus is unpaid and working alone. Last year, he was hospitalized for months for a condition compounded by a COVID-19 infection.

"I was in the hospital for 10 months, and I was supposed to have died, but the Lord let me live for some reason. And this has got to be part of it," he said.

The lawsuit pits him against the state of Alaska, which is representing the Division of Elections, and the well-funded group that promoted the ballot measure.

"I feel like I'm like the little Dutch boy, Hans Brinker, with his finger in the dike, trying to prevent this flood from coming over Alaska," he said.

Documents filed Thursday outline a tentative schedule that calls for all sides in the lawsuit to trade written arguments before mid-May. After that, Anchorage Superior Court Judge Gregory Miller could hear arguments in court and render a verdict.

Regardless of the result, Jacobus and Kendall said they expect it to be appealed to the Alaska Supreme Court in the fall.

• • •

Alaska's next statewide election is more than 18 months away, but because of the speed with which the court system operates, there are practical deadlines if someone wants to file a legal challenge.

"I think you probably don't have a hard deadline on a constitutional issue," said Craig Richards, a former Alaska attorney general now in private practice. "If it's unconstitutional, it's unconstitutional. That being said, there's a practical deadline that if you wait until three weeks before the election, the courts aren't going to be very sympathetic to you, in terms of, you know, hurrying the case along."

"So I would think if someone wants to get a conclusion to these answers before the next election ... they would need to file fairly soon," he said.

The Alaska Democratic Party stayed neutral during the campaign involving Ballot Measure 2, and a spokeswoman for the party declined to say whether the party would become involved with any lawsuit. Former Democratic U.S. Sen. Mark Begich, who opposed the measure, did not answer a call seeking comment Thursday.

The state Republican Party contributed to the campaign against the measure, and many Republicans voted against it.

Bob Bird, chairman of the Alaskan Independence Party and one of the plaintiffs in the lawsuit, said he believes there is broad support in the Republican State Central Committee for joining the lawsuit.

"Glenn Clary is the guy who's dragging his feet," he said, referring to the party's state chairman.

Clary said that isn't true.

"No decision has yet been made," he said. "The party is considering all of its options."

Marc Hellenthal, a longtime Alaska political consultant, suggested that funding issues and internal Republican divides are contributing to a lack of action by party leaders.

"Whoever wants to litigate has got to bring their checkbook," he said.

Clary said, "If the party decides legal action is the right course, resources will not be an obstacle."

Former state chairman Tuckerman Babcock said "volunteers and limited donations" are one reason for not becoming involved.

"The other is, apparently, leadership is choosing not to act."

• • •

Next year, Republican U.S. Sen. Lisa Murkowski will be challenged by former state administration commissioner Kelly Tshibaka, another Republican. Other candidates are expected to enter the race.

Tshibaka is more conservative than Murkowski, giving her a potential advantage during a primary election in which only Republicans and independents would decide the winner. In 2010, conservative Joe Miller defeated Murkowski in such a primary. (Murkowski returned as a write-in candidate during the general election and won.)

Under the state's new primary election system, Murkowski wouldn't risk a repeat of 2010. All candidates will be lumped together in the primary, and the top four vote-getters, regardless of party, will advance to the general election.

Murkowski has broad name recognition in Alaska, and the Ballot Measure 2 approach could be favorable to her in the new top-four primary, Hellenthal said.

"It's pretty obvious: If you want to get Lisa out of the race, the best way to do it is to rescind Prop 2," he said.

Randy Ruedrich is a former state chairman of the Alaska Republican Party and treasurer of Tshibaka's campaign. Asked about Hellenthal's comment, he said, "You run a campaign based on the law that you're working with. It changes the strategy, it doesn't change the result."

"I think you just plan your campaign based on what the election law of the year is," he said.

About this Author

James Brooks

Juneau-based James Brooks covers state government, the Alaska Legislature and general assignments for the Daily News. He previously reported and edited for the Juneau Empire, Kodiak Daily Mirror and Fairbanks Daily News-Miner.



Too cute by half

Exclusive new poll suggests Prop 2 ploy will backfire on Murkowski in re-election bid

Though her people thought it was a vaccine against a Joe Miller recurrence, ranked choice voting may keep Lisa from even reaching the general election

BY MAXWELL STEVENS

The 2020-21 United States Senate runoff elections in Georgia, Those that led to the election of Jon Ossoff and Rev. Raphael Warnock, were the most expensive Senate Races in U.S. History. They were also a prime example of how a plan that's too cute by half, backfires.

Should you not remember, this election took place right before the horrifying riots at the U.S. Capitol. Tensions were high all over the country as the President and some of his most loyal allies were claiming fraud, that the November election had been rigged. Just before the election, the President held one of his big GOTV rallies in Georgia for the incumbent U.S. Senators. The strategy was clear: use the anger and frustration stemming from his accusations of fraud and 'Stop the Steal' to turn out every single base voter in order for the two incumbents to prevail. He blasted Republican state officials – including the Governor and Secretary of State – and made it clear that participating in the upcoming runoff elections was the way to fight back.

The strategy backfired. It was too cute by half. Turnout in rural parts of the state – exactly where the Trump GOP was trying to turn out everyone and anyone – was unexpectedly low. Many political pundits have argued the President's tactics were just too much. His attempt to transfer anger and frustration had the reverse effect. Those who needed to vote, didn't.


> The Murkowski people will try to keep a strong Democrat out, but they will fail. They are just too cute, by half. They may have just given the Democratic party a way back.

Alaska in 2022 may provide another prime example of a 'too cute by half' strategy destined to backfire. Particularly, the strategy that has been implemented to get Lisa Murkowski (a wildly disliked incumbent) re-elected seems to be on a path to in fact give a Democrat or Democratic-leaning independent a unique opportunity to win. The strategy was the passage – with millions of corporate dollars – of Proposition 2 on the November 2020 General Election ballot.

For much of 2019 and 2020, top Lisa Murkowski thugs – such as her former campaign manager – bullied local Democrats into thinking Prop 2 was going to be good for the state and for the party. These folks had fancy reports and research inquiries – all funded by people such as Tom Arnold (the right-wing charter school fanatic) and lobbyists – which they would cleverly present to local Democrats simply as a means of tricking them into either supporting the initiative or staying neutral. They thwarted any attempt to fight against Prop 2 by personally smearing individuals associated with the "No on 2" efforts. It was disgusting politics.

The Prop 2 team had spent months telling folks how they know the numbers better than anyone and that Prop 2 would pass with at least 58 percent of the vote. After all, they massively outspent the "No on 2" efforts. They barely won the election. Their math was wrong, and it almost cost them victory.

As the main result of Prop 2 – various other sneaky things were embedded in the language of the initiative – the state will now have an all-party primary in August and the top four vote-getters will head to a November General election in which ranked choice voting sets in. This system (which many municipalities around the country are now getting rid of after seeing it fail) allows voters to rank their vote across the four candidates, if they'd like to. That means you can pick a first, second, third, and fourth choice. After the initial vote, those who come in third and fourth places are disqualified and their ranked votes (the choices from their voters for



MURKOWSKI, continued on Page 14

PAGE B PAGE 1 OF 2

Kelly Tshibaka's background and experience connect with voters...

Tshibaka's experience improving efficiencies in government and saving taxpayer dollars (69% more likely / 9% less likely) and deep Alaska roots and personal story (57% more likely / 6% less likely) make strong majorities of likely primary voters more likely to support her, and are extremely compelling with Republicans (82%, 69% more likely).

...while Murkowski's record is rejected by Alaska voters, especially Republicans.

Murkowski's 20-year tenure in the Senate (-39 net-less likely) and vote to allow millions of illegal immigrants who broke laws to enter the country to stay (-31) are nearly universal negatives. Among Republicans, her vote to convict President Trump in the impeachment trial, opposition to Justice Kavanaugh's nomination to the SCOTUS, and ranking as the second most liberal Republican Senator are all particularly damaging (78%, 79%, 77% less likely, respectively).

METHODOLOGY: This probabilistic survey was conducted with 5031 likely 2022 primary election voters. It has a margin of error of ±4.37%. Known registered voters were interviewed via live phones, SMS, and email invitation. This survey was weighted to a likely 2022 primary election voter universe.

MURKOWSKI, FROM PAGE 10

third, second and first) rank up to the first and second place finishers. That's how someone ultimately gets a majority.

It's convoluted — and too cute by half — but the crux of the strategy as it relates to the U.S. Senate race is/was as follows: assure Murkowski a second-place victory so that she receives the second choice votes of the likely third place contestant, who is bound to be the Democrat.

The Murkowski strategy assumes she can find enough votes to come in second and that enough Democrats and Democratic-leaning independents will do what they've done before — have her back, this time, by listing her as their second choice.

The problem is, however, Lisa Murkowski is wildly disliked.

In various 2020 polls and in the recent publicly produced CYGNAL Poll of the 2022 electorate, her numbers are not what they were in the past. She has only a 33 percent favorability among the electorate, meaning most likely not even 20 percent who say "very favorable," and only a 10 percent favorability with Republicans. Let us not forget, she IS a Republican.

As the poll showed (and various other polling has apparently demonstrated, though hasn't been released), Lisa would have a very hard time coming in second. Remember, even in 2016 when the Democrats didn't field a strong candidate, the combined vote between Ray Metcalf (the nominee of the Democratic party) and Margaret Stock, the Democratic-leaning independent who raised only $400,000 was 25 percent.


Given that the electorate regularly describes itself as anywhere from 29 percent to 32 percent 'Democrat,' which includes some independents who just don't register as Democrats, it will be very hard for Lisa to garner enough votes to come in second behind the preferred Republican, who will likely receive 40 percent of the vote.

So, let's keep it simple: 40 percent for Kelly Tshibaka, 33 percent (maybe slightly more or less) for a well-funded Democrat and 6 percent for an AIP or Libertarian type coming in fourth. That leaves only 21 percent or so of the vote Lisa.

That puts her in third, with most of her second-choice vote going to the Democrat, giving them a real path to the 50 percent threshold against a very right-wing and outside the mainstream Kelly Tshibaka.

The Murkowski people will try to keep a strong Democrat out, but they will fail. They are just too cute, by half. They may have just given the Democratic party a way back.

Alaska Wood Shop carves out name for itself



The Alaska Wood Shop owner Mike Blodgett can usually be found in his shop working from one unique project to the next.

"If it's made out of wood I build it," Blodgett said.

Blodgett said that he mostly works on furniture and cabinets, but he's worked on just about every kind of project involving wood. He's currently working on five different projects ranging from custom cabinetry work to designing a captain's bed.

"I've got ADHD and I tend to bounce a lot," Blodgett said. "I don't have a chance to get bored... I like to move around const and keep my mind busy."

According to Blodgett, the local trends tend to fluctuate and popular types of requests vary year to year. He noted that people tend to buy beds during the winter months, and he usually handles a lot of cabinet projects this time of year.

"Last summer, the big thing was desks," Blodgett said. "I get a pretty good mixture but it comes in spurts. It ebbs and flows a lot."

Blodgett said that he built his first piece of furniture 50 years ago. His father had a wood shop and started teaching him the craft when he was 5 years old.

"I was always the slave of the wood shop... Actually, when I hit about 18, I hated it. I always got the grunt work. I was also an auto mechanic... I got tired of the grease of working on cars. I was sick of the sawdust. So, I went to the military and became a cop," Blodgett said. "To this day I still hate sanding... I got a big machine over there that does the sanding."

Blodgett spent over a decade serving in the U.S. Air Force and returned to the Valley in 1992. He said that he was just starting to dabble with woodwork again when his house burnt down. After the incident, he started was rebuilding his life with his wife, Sue.

He started by building cabinets for their kitchen, moving onto other projects, eventually accumulating a large number of tools. He said that his wife told him that he should start thinking about paying off his tools with his woodworking skills, so he started building his own business. He hasn't looked back since.

"I set my own hours, make my own rules. I like this much better... People tell me I'm good at it snd I don't have to work for somebody else... There's a lot of things I know how to do but this ended up being the one I fell into," Blodgett said.

Blodgett said that he started taking small projects here and there, shifting to a full-time shop with an accompanying website about five years ago. He credited much of his success to Sue for helping him stay organized and flourish through her financial fortitude and her bolstering business savvy.

"She made this all happen. Without her support, I never would have gotten where I'm at. It's definitely a partnership effort," Blodgett said.

Blodgett also thanked his marketing crew for helping him build his presence in the community with a streamlined website.

"A lot of people find me through my website," Blodgett said.

The Alaska Wood Shop website is filled with images of Blodgett's work. The website is what drew Big Lake snowbird couple Al and Celeste Bolea to his services.

"Whoever made the website, it's working," Al said.

The Big Lake couple is currently ordering custom cabinetry for their summer cabin. Al said that he's confident in Blodgett's abilities by looking around his sawdust strewn shop.





MAY 4, 2021, AT 6:00 AM

California Voters Should Start Preparing For A Recall Election

But don't go calling Caitlyn Jenner governor yet.

By Nathaniel Rakich

Filed under Recalls



DAVID MCNEW / AFP VIA GETTY IMAGES

Opponents of California Democratic Gov. Gavin Newsom needed to collect 1,495,709 valid signatures in order to . And on April 26, the state announced that they had turned in . As a result, a statewide gubernatorial recall election ( ) will likely take place in the fall — but it's not a sure bet just yet.

That's because in 2017, Democratic legislators changed the rules to give recall supporters 30 business days to reconsider and request that their names be removed from the recall petition. (The change was an attempt to a brewing recall effort against a

Democratic state senator; however, he was [illegible], only to reclaim his seat in last year's election.) So if Newsom's supporters can convince enough recall signatories to recant [illegible], he can avoid a referendum. That said, California political observers don't think that's likely to happen.

[illegible] before the recall election hits the ballot, though. If the secretary of state finds that enough signatures remain to trigger a recall, the California Department of Finance then has 30 business days to estimate the cost of the election, and the state legislature has up to 30 more days to review that estimate. Once that's done, the lieutenant governor will schedule the recall election for a date between 60 and 80 days hence, probably putting it sometime in October or November. A logical choice might be Nov. 2 — already Election Day in many states around the country. Then again, the Democratic legislature and lieutenant governor may try to schedule the recall for whichever date they feel gives the Democratic governor the best odds of winning. (As long as they stick to the window of time provided by law, they have discretion to affect which date gets chosen.)

At that point, the recall would go before voters, with two questions on the ballot: first, a yes-no question about whether to remove Newsom from office, and second, a question about who should replace him if more than 50 percent vote "yes" to remove him. [illegible], there's a good chance that Newsom will prevail on the first question. No polls of the recall election have been released since late March, but [illegible] from then found that only 35-40 percent of likely voters wanted to remove Newsom, while 53-56 percent said they would vote to retain him.

That's a very different position from where fellow Democrat [illegible] found himself before he was successfully recalled as governor of California in 2003. A [illegible] taken in April 2003 found that 46 percent of registered voters were in favor of recalling Davis versus 43 percent opposed — and Davis's [illegible] only [illegible] from there.

This year, though, the long delay between signature collection (which ended March 17) and the recall election may take the wind out of Newsom haters' sails. The recall campaign gathered so many signatures largely because [illegible] were [illegible], and his public image had taken a hit after he [illegible] by [illegible], an exclusive Napa Valley restaurant. But with vaccination rates on the rise, California, like every other state, is [illegible], and by November it will have been a full year since the French Laundry incident.

But if things instead go south for Newsom and more than 50 percent of voters vote "yes" on the first question, the second question on the ballot would determine his replacement. The candidate with the most votes on the second question would be elected California's new governor; there is no runoff. That means, in a large field of candidates, even a small plurality of the vote could be enough to win. And a large field of candidates is very possible: In 2003, voters had .

Already, several prominent Republicans have announced their intention to run. Potentially the strongest — at least judging by electoral track record — is Kevin Faulconer, a moderate who was twice elected mayor of swingy San Diego. Businessman John Cox, a perennial candidate who lost to Newsom by 24 points in 2018, and former Rep. Doug Ose, who last won an election in 2002, are also running. But the race's biggest name may be former Olympic athlete and reality-television star Caitlyn Jenner, who on April 23.

Jenner quickly to another celebrity, Arnold Schwarzenegger, the action star who famously won the 2003 recall election to replace Davis. But while Jenner's fame could certainly help her, she doesn't have nearly the kind of fan base that Schwarzenegger did. In February 2003, Gallup found that Schwarzenegger was one of the most popular people the then-68-year-old firm had ever polled, with a . A from CNN/USA Today/Gallup also found that Schwarzenegger started the recall campaign with a whopping 82 percent favorable rating and just a 10 percent unfavorable rating among likely voters. No pollster has asked Californians about Jenner yet, but a from January-March 2021 gave her just an 18 percent favorable rating — along with a 48 percent unfavorable rating.

At this point, no major Democratic candidates have announced a campaign, although there are clues that and are considering running. (Newsom himself cannot run in the replacement election.) So if a single big-name Democrat were to run, it could serve as an insurance policy for Democrats in case Newsom is recalled: With the Republican vote split at least four ways, it's easy to imagine a Democratic candidate finishing first, especially considering you don't have to vote "yes" on the first question to vote on the second question. In other words, Democrats could vote "no" on recalling Newsom but then still select Villaraigosa or Steyer as their preferred replacement.

However, Newsom's allies are working hard to ensure , fearing that this might encourage Democrats to vote "yes" on the recall if they

see a chance to replace him with someone they like even better. It would also undermine Newsom's strategy to fight back against the recall, which is to [illegible] by supporters of former President Donald Trump, who is extremely unpopular in California. But so long as the recall stays a Democrat-vs.-Republicans contest, Newsom should win easily. If the Democratic base isn't united behind the governor, though, things could get interesting.

Footnotes

1. This number equals 12 percent of all ballots cast in the last gubernatorial election, the minimum threshold to initiate a special recall election.
2. About 140,000 signatures still have yet to be verified, so the final number will likely be a bit higher.

2003 California gubernatorial recall election

The **2003 California gubernatorial recall election** was a special election permitted under California state law. It resulted in voters replacing incumbent Democratic Governor Gray Davis with Republican Arnold Schwarzenegger. The recall effort spanned the latter half of 2003. Seven of the nine previous governors, including Davis, had faced unsuccessful recall attempts.[1]


After several legal and procedural efforts failed to stop it, California's first-ever gubernatorial recall election was held on October 7, and the results were certified on November 14, 2003, making Davis the first governor recalled in the history of California, and just the second in U.S. history (the first was North Dakota's 1921 recall of Lynn Frazier).[2] California is one of 19 states that allow recalls.[3]

Nearly 18 years after the 2003 election, California is set to hold a second recall election in 2021.[4]


2003 California gubernatorial recall election



October 7, 2003



Candidate	Arnold Schwarzenegger	Cruz Bustamante	Tom McClintock
Party	Republican	Democratic	Republican
Popular vote	**4,206,284**	2,724,874	1,161,287
Percentage	**48.6%**	31.5%	13.4%



Governor before election **Elected Governor**

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  - Concurrent alternatives
  - Availability of Spanish-speaking poll workers
  - Punch card ballots
- Polling
- Results

See also

References

External links
- Recall information


Gray Davis
Democratic

ıold Schwarzenegger
Republican

Vote on recall

Results

Response	Votes	%
✓ **Yes**	**4,976,274**	**55.39%**
✗ **No**	4,007,783	44.61%
Valid votes	8,984,057	95.44%
Invalid or blank votes	429,431	4.56%
Total votes	**9,413,488**	**100.00%**



Results by county

California recall history

The California recall process became law in 1911 as the result of Progressive Era reforms that spread across the United States in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. The ability to recall elected officials came along with the initiative and referendum processes. The movement in California was spearheaded by Republican Governor Hiram Johnson, a reformist, who called the recall process a "precautionary measure by which a recalcitrant official can be removed." No illegality has to be committed by politicians in order for them to be recalled. If an elected official commits a crime while in office, the state legislature can hold impeachment trials. For a recall, only the will of the people is necessary to remove an official.[5] Nineteen U.S. states, along with the District of Columbia, allow the recall of state officials.[6]


Before the successful recall of Gray Davis, no California statewide official had ever been recalled, though there had been 117 previous attempts. Only seven of those even made it onto the ballot, all for state legislators. Every governor since Ronald Reagan in 1968 has been subject to a recall effort. Gray Davis was the first governor of California whose opponents gathered the necessary signatures to qualify for a special election. Davis also faced a recall petition in 1999, but that effort failed to gain enough signatures to qualify for the ballot. Davis's recall at the time was only the second gubernatorial recall election in

U.S. history. The first governor r. .ll occurred in 1921, when North D. .ta's Lynn J. Frazier was recalled over a dispute about state-owned industries, and was replaced by Ragnvald A. Nestos.[7] A third gubernatorial recall election occurred in Wisconsin in 2012 which unlike the previous two, failed.

The 2003 recall was prompted by some actions taken by Davis and his predecessor, Governor Wilson. Many people were upset with the governor's decision to block the enactment of Proposition 187, which had been found unconstitutional by a Federal District Court. Davis, who had opposed the measure, decided not appeal the case to the US Supreme Court, effectively killing the ballot measure. He also signed two new restrictive gun-control laws. Also, many people were very angry about the ongoing California electricity crisis. The crisis was brought on by a series of deregulatory moves, including a bill signed into law by the previous Governor. As Davis's recall transpired before he had served half of his term as governor, he remained eligible to serve another term, should he win a future election for the California governor post.

Background

California law


California Secretary of State building on October 7, 2003.

Under California law, any elected official may be the target of a recall campaign.[8] To trigger a recall election, proponents of the recall must gather a certain number of signatures from registered voters within a certain time period. The number of signatures statewide must equal 12% of the number of votes cast in the previous election for that office.[9] For the 2003 recall election, that meant a minimum of 897,156 signatures, based on the November 2002 statewide elections.[10]

The effort to recall Gray Davis began with Republicans Ted Costa, Mark Abernathy, and Howard Kaloogian, who filed their petition with the California Secretary of State and started gathering signatures. The effort was not taken seriously until Rep. Darrell Issa, who hoped to run as a replacement candidate for governor, donated $2 million to a new committee, Rescue California, which then led the effort. Eventually, proponents gathered about 1.6 million signatures, of which 1,356,408 were certified as valid.[10]

Under most circumstances in which a recall campaign against a statewide elected official has gathered the required number of signatures, the governor is required to schedule a special election for the recall vote.[11] If the recall campaign qualified less than 180 days prior to the next regularly scheduled election, then the recall becomes part of that regularly scheduled election.[12] In the case of a recall against the governor, the responsibility for scheduling a special election falls on the lieutenant governor,[13] who in 2003 was Cruz Bustamante.[14]

Political climate

The political climate was largely shaped by the California electricity crisis of the early 2000s, during which many people experienced a tripling in the cost of their energy consumption as rolling blackouts happened throughout the state. The public held Davis partly responsible, although the causes included Federal deregulation and California's Electric Utility Industry Restructuring Act, signed into law by

Governor Wilson.[15] Driving the outcome of the recall was the perception that Davis had mismanaged the events leading up to the energy crisis. It was claimed that he had not fought vigorously for Californians against the energy fraud, and that he had not pushed for legislative or emergency executive action against the fraudulent companies soon enough. He was said to have signed deals agreeing to pay energy companies fixed yet inflated prices for years to come based on those paid during the crisis. Opponents felt that a corporate-friendly Republican governor could shield California politically from further corporate fraud. Others speculated that the corporations involved sought not only profit, but were acting in concert with Republican political allies to cause political damage to the nationally influential Democratic governor. Still others, such as Arianna Huffington, argued that Davis's fundraising and campaign contributions from various companies, including energy companies, rendered him unable to confront his contributors.

Davis had accepted $2,000,000 from the California Correctional Peace Officers Association, and used his political connections to pass an estimated $5,000,000,000 raise for them over the coming years. That led many people throughout California to believe Davis was guilty of corruption, even if he did not meet the standard necessary for prosecution.[16]

Arguments about the recall drive

Backers of the recall effort cited Davis's alleged lack of leadership, combined with California's weakened and hurt economy. According to the circulated petition:

> [Governor Davis's actions were a] gross mismanagement of California Finances by overspending taxpayers' money, threatening public safety by cutting funds to local governments, failing to account for the exorbitant cost of the energy, and failing in general to deal with the state's major problems until they get to the crisis stage.[17]

Opponents of the recall said the situation was more complicated, for several reasons.

The entire United States and many of its economic trading partners had been in economic recession. California was hit harder than other states at the end of the speculative bubble known as the "dot-com bubble"—from 1996 to 2000—when Silicon Valley was the center of the internet economy. California state expenditures soared when the government was flush with revenues. Some Californians blamed Davis and the state legislature for continuing to spend heavily while revenues dried up, ultimately leading to record deficits.

Also, the California electricity crisis of 2000–2001 caused great financial damage to the state of California. The legal issues still were not resolved in time to alleviate California's dire need for electricity, and the state instituted "rolling blackouts" and in some cases instituted penalties for excess energy use. In the recall campaign, Republicans and others opposed to Davis's governance sometimes charged that Davis did not "respond properly" to the crisis. In fact most economists disagreed, believing that Davis could do little else—and anyone in the governor's office would have had to capitulate as Davis did, in the absence of federal help. The Bush administration rejected requests for federal intervention, responding that it was California's problem to solve.[18] Still, subsequent revelations of corporate accounting scandals and market manipulation by some Texas-based energy companies did little to quiet the criticism of Davis's handling of the crisis.

Davis swept into the governor's office in 1998 in a landslide victory and a 60% approval rating as California's economy roared to new heights during the dot-com boom. Davis took his mandate from the voters and sought out a centrist political position, refusing some demands from labor unions and teachers' organizations on the left. The Democratic Davis, already opposed by Republicans, began losing favor among members of his own party. Nevertheless, Davis's approval ratings remained above 50%.

When the California electricity crisis slammed the state in 2001, Davis was blasted for his slow and ineffective response. His approval rating dropped into the 30s and never recovered. When the energy crisis settled down, Davis's administration was hit with a fund-raising scandal. California had a $95 million contract with Oracle Corporation that was found to be unnecessary and overpriced by the state auditor. Three of Davis's aides were fired or resigned after it was revealed that the governor's technology adviser accepted a $25,000 campaign contribution shortly after the contract was signed. The money was returned, but the scandal fueled close scrutiny of Davis's fundraising for his 2002 re-election bid.

In the 2002 primary election, Davis ran unopposed for the Democratic nomination. He spent his campaign funds on attack ads against California Secretary of State Bill Jones and Los Angeles mayor Richard Riordan, the two well known moderates in the Republican primary. The result was that his opponent in the general election was conservative Republican and political newcomer Bill Simon, who was popular within his own party but unknown by the majority of the state population. The attacks from both sides turned off voters and suppressed turnout; Davis ultimately won with 47% of the vote. The suppressed turnout had the effect of lowering the threshold for the 2003 recall petition to qualify.

On December 18, 2002, just over a month after being reelected, Davis announced that California would face a record budget deficit possibly as high as $35 billion, a forecast $13.7 billion higher than one a month earlier. The number was finally estimated to be $38.2 billion, more than all 49 other states' deficits combined. Already suffering from low approval ratings, Davis's numbers hit historic lows in April 2003 with 24% approval and 65% disapproval, according to a California Field Poll. Davis was almost universally disliked by both Republicans and Democrats in the state and a recall push was high.

A hot-button issue that seemed to galvanize the public was the vehicle license fee increase Davis implemented under provisions of legislation passed by his predecessor which originally reduced the fees.[19] On June 20, 2003, the Davis administration re-instituted the full vehicle license fee, and the action withstood legal challenge. The action was a key step in the plan to close the $38 billion shortfall in the 2003–2004 budget. The increase tripled the vehicle license fee for the average car owner, and began appearing in renewal notices starting August 1. The California state budget passed in late July 2003 included the projected $4 billion in increased vehicle license fee revenue.

Proponents of the Governor's recall characterized the increase as a tax hike and used it as an issue in the recall campaign. In mid-August 2003, Davis floated a plan to reverse the increase, making up the revenue with taxes on high income earners, cigarettes, and alcoholic beverages.

When Gray Davis was recalled and Arnold Schwarzenegger was elected governor in October 2003, Schwarzenegger vowed that his first act as governor would be to revoke the vehicle license fee increase. On November 17, just after his inauguration, Gov. Schwarzenegger signed Executive Order S-1-03, rescinding the vehicle license fee retroactive to October 1, 2003 when the fee increase went into effect. Analysts predicted that this would add more than $4 billion to the state deficit. Schwarzenegger did not indicate how cities and counties would be reimbursed for the lost revenue they received from the license fee to support public safety and other local government activities.

Recall election

Background

On February 5, 2003, anti-tax activist Ted Costa announced a plan to start a petition drive to recall Davis. Several committees were formed to collect signatures, but Costa's Davis Recall Committee was the only one authorized by the state to submit signatures. One committee "Recall Gray Davis Committee", organized by Republican political consultant Sal Russo and former Republican assemblyman Howard Kaloogian played a smaller role in drumming up support. Kaloogian served as chairman, Russo as chief strategist of the committee.[20] After the recall both Kaloogian and Russo went on to found Move America Forward.[21][22]

By law, the committee had to collect signatures from registered California voters amounting to 12% of the number of Californians who voted in the previous gubernatorial election (November 2002) for the special recall vote to take place. The organization was given the go-ahead to collect signatures on March 25, 2003. Organizers had 160 days to collect signatures. Specifically, they had to collect at least 897,158 valid signatures from registered voters by September 2, 2003.

The recall movement began slowly, largely relying on talk radio, a website, cooperative e-mail, word-of-mouth, and grassroots campaigning to drive the signature gathering. Davis derided the effort as "partisan mischief" by "a handful of right-wing politicians" and called the proponents losers. Nevertheless, by mid-May recall proponents said they had gathered 300,000 signatures. They sought to gather the necessary signatures by July in order to get the special election in the fall of 2003 instead of March 2004 during the Democratic presidential primary election, when Democratic Party turnout would presumably be higher. The effort continued to gather signatures, but the recall was far from a sure thing and the proponents were short on cash to promote their cause.

The movement took off when wealthy U.S. Representative Darrell Issa, a Republican representing San Diego, California, announced on May 6 that he would use his personal money to push the effort. All told, he contributed $1.7 million of his own money to finance advertisements and professional signature-gatherers. With the movement accelerated, the recall effort began to make national news and soon appeared to be almost a sure thing. The only question was whether signatures would be collected quickly enough to force the special election to take place in late 2003 rather than in March 2004.

The Issa recall committee's e-mail claimed that California Secretary of State Kevin Shelley, belonging to the same party as the Governor, resisted certification of the recall signatures as long as possible. By mid-May, the recall organization was calling for funds to begin a lawsuit against Shelley, and publicly considered a separate recall effort for the Secretary of State (also an elected official in California).

However, by July 23, 2003, recall advocates turned in over 110% of the required signatures, and on that date, the Secretary of State announced that the signatures had been certified and a recall election would take place. Proponents had set a goal of 1.2 million to provide a buffer in case of invalid signatures. In the end, there were 1,363,411 valid signatures out of 1,660,245 collected (897,156 required).

On July 24, Lieutenant Governor Cruz Bustamante announced that Davis would face a recall election on October 7. This was to be the second gubernatorial recall election in United States history and the first in the history of California.

California's Constitution required that a recall election be held within 80 days of the date the recall petition was certified, or within 180 days if a regularly scheduled statewide election came within that time. Had the petition been certified at the deadline of September 2, the election would have been held in March 2004, the next scheduled statewide election. Instead, Bustamante had to select a date. He chose Tuesday, October 7, 2003, which was 76 days after the date of certification.

Top candidates


In total, 135 candidates qualified for the ballot for the October 7 recall election. Several of the candidates were prominent celebrities. In the election, only four candidates received at least 1% of the vote:

- Cruz Bustamante, lieutenant governor, Democrat[23]
- Peter Camejo, 2002 Green Party candidate for governor
- Tom McClintock, State Senator, Republican[24]
- Arnold Schwarzenegger, Hollywood actor, Republican[25]

Election process

The ballot consisted of two questions; voters could vote on one or the other, or on both. The first question asked whether Gray Davis should be recalled. It was a simple yes/no question, and if a majority voted no, then the second question would become irrelevant and Gray Davis would remain California governor. If a majority voted yes, then Davis would be removed from office once the vote was certified, and the second question would determine his successor.

Voters had to choose one candidate from a long list of 135 candidates. Voters who voted against recalling Gray Davis could still vote for a candidate to replace him in case the recall vote succeeded. The candidate receiving the most votes (a plurality) would then become the next governor of California. Certification by the Secretary of State of California would require completion within 39 days of the election, and history indicated that it could require that entire time frame to certify the statewide election results. Once the results were certified, a newly elected governor would have to be sworn into office within 10 days.



Sample ballot; the recall question, along with the list of replacement candidates fills the first three columns. The order of the names on the ballot was determined by a randomization of the sequence of the alphabet, with the list being shifted in each of the state's 80 Assembly districts (hence, with 135 candidates in this race, some candidates were not able to be listed first in at least one district)[26]

Filing requirements and candidates

Those Californians wishing to run for governor were given until August 9 to file. The requirements to run were relatively low and attracted a number of interesting and strange candidates. A California citizen needed only to gather 65 signatures from their own party and pay a nonrefundable $3,500 fee to become a candidate, or in lieu of the fee collect up to 10,000 signatures from any party, the fee being prorated by the fraction of 10,000 valid signatures the candidate filed. No candidate in fact collected more than a handful of signatures-in-lieu, so that all paid almost the entire fee. In addition, however, candidates from recognized third parties were allowed on the ballot with *no* fee if they could collect 150 signatures from their own party.

The low requirements attracted many "average joes" with no political experience to file as well as several celebrity candidates. Many prominent potential candidates chose not to run. These included Democratic U.S. Senator Dianne Feinstein, widely regarded as the most popular statewide office-holding Democrat in California, who cited her own experience with a recall drive while she was mayor of San Francisco.

Darrell Issa, who bankrolled the call effort and had said he would r for governor, abruptly dropped out of the race on August 7 among accusations that he had bankrolled the recall effort solely to get himself into office. Issa claimed that Schwarzenegger's decision to run did not affect his decision and he dropped out because he was assured that there were several strong candidates running in the recall.[27] The *San Francisco Chronicle* claimed that Davis's attacks on Issa's "checkered past" and polls showing strong Republican support for Schwarzenegger caused Issa to withdraw.[27]

Former Mayor of Los Angeles Richard Riordan and actor Arnold Schwarzenegger (a fellow Republican) agreed that only one of them would run; when Schwarzenegger announced on *The Tonight Show with Jay Leno* that he would be a candidate, Riordan dropped out of the race. Riordan was surprised and those close to him say angered when he learned Schwarzenegger was running. Riordan did end up endorsing Schwarzenegger, but his endorsement was described as terse and matter-of-fact in contrast to his usually effusive way.[27]

State Insurance Commissioner John Garamendi (a Democrat) announced on August 7 that he would be a candidate for governor. However, just two days later and only hours before the deadline to file, he announced "I will not engage in this election as a candidate", adding, "this recall election has become a circus." Garamendi had been under tremendous pressure to drop out from fellow Democrats who feared a split of the Democratic vote between him and Lt. Gov. Cruz Bustamante, should the recall succeed.

Campaign


On September 3, five top candidates—independent Arianna Huffington, Democratic Lt. Gov. Cruz Bustamante, Green Party candidate Peter Camejo, Republican State Senator Tom McClintock, and former baseball commissioner Peter Ueberroth—participated in a live television debate. Noticeably absent was Arnold Schwarzenegger who opponents charged was not adequately prepared.[28] Schwarzenegger had repeatedly stated that he would not participate in such events until later in the election cycle. Prior to this first debate, Gov. Davis spent 30 minutes answering questions from a panel of journalists and voters.

Due to the media attention focused on some candidates, GSN held a game show debate entitled *Who Wants to Be Governor of California? – The Debating Game*, a political game show featuring six candidates unlikely to win the election, including former child star Gary Coleman and porn star Mary Carey.

Several candidates who would still be listed on the ballot dropped out of the campaign before the October 7 election. On August 23, Republican Bill Simon (the 2002 party nominee) announced he was dropping out. He said, "There are too many Republicans in this race and the people of our state simply cannot risk a continuation of the Gray Davis legacy." Simon did not endorse any candidates at the time, but several weeks later he endorsed front-runner Arnold Schwarzenegger, as did Darrell Issa, who had not filed for the race. On September 9, former MLB commissioner and Los Angeles Olympic Committee President Peter Ueberroth withdrew his candidacy in the recall election.

On September 24, the remaining top five candidates (Schwarzenegger, Bustamante, Huffington, McClintock, and Camejo) gathered in the University Ballroom at California State University, Sacramento, for a live televised debate[29] that resembled the red-carpet premiere of a movie in Hollywood. Schwarzenegger's marquee name attracted large crowds, a carnival atmosphere, and an army of hundreds of credentialed media from around the world. While the candidate and his staff rode on buses named *Running Man* and *Total Recall*, the reporters' buses were named after *Predator*.[30]

The aftermath of the debate was swift. On September 30, author Arianna Huffington withdrew her candidacy on the *Larry King Live* television program and announced that she was opposing the recall entirely in light of Arnold Schwarzenegger's surge in the polls. Apparently in response to her withdrawal, Cruz Bustamante endorsed her plan for public financing of election campaigns, an intended anti-corruption measure.



Newsvans at Schwarzenegger inauguration.

Election issues

Concurrent alternatives

On July 29, 2003, federal judge Barry Moskowitz ruled section 11382 of the California election code unconstitutional. The provision required that only those voters who had voted in favor of the recall could cast a vote for a candidate for governor. The judge ruled that a voter could vote for or against the recall election and still vote for a replacement candidate. Secretary of State Kevin Shelley did not contest the ruling, thereby setting a legal precedent.

Availability of Spanish-speaking poll workers

In August, a federal judge in San Jose announced that he was considering issuing an order postponing the recall election. Activists in Monterey County had filed suit, claiming that Monterey County, and other counties of California affected by the Voting Rights Act were violating the act by announcing that, because of budgetary constraints, they were planning on hiring fewer Spanish-speaking poll watchers, and were going to cut back by almost half the number of polling places. On September 5, a three-member panel of federal judges ruled that the county's election plans did not constitute a violation of the federal Voting Rights Act.

Punch card ballots

A lawsuit filed in Los Angeles by the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) claimed that the use of the "hanging chad" style punch-card ballots still in use in six California counties (Los Angeles, Mendocino, Sacramento, San Diego, Santa Clara, and Solano) were in violation of fair election laws. U.S. District Judge Stephen V. Wilson in Los Angeles ruled on August 20, 2003, that the election would not be delayed because of the punch-card ballot problems. There was an estimate that up 40,000 voters in those heavily minority districts might be disenfranchised, if the election were not postponed to remedy the difficulty. His ruling was appealed, and heard by three judges in the 9th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals. On September 15, the judges issued a unanimous ruling postponing the recall election until March 2004, on the grounds that the existence of allegedly obsolete voting equipment in those six counties violated the equal protection constitutional guarantee, thus overruling the lower district court which had rejected this argument.[31]

Recall proponents questioned why punch-card ballots were adequate enough to elect Governor Davis, but were not good enough to recall him. Proponents planned to appeal the postponement to the U.S. Supreme Court. However, an 11-judge *en banc* panel, also from the Ninth U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals and quickly and carefully canvassed by Judge Alex Kozinski, gathered to rehear the controversial case.[31] On the morning of September 23, the panel reversed the three-judge ruling in a unanimous decision, arguing that the concerns about the punch-card ballots were outweighed by the harm that would be done by postponing the election.

Further legal appeals were disc. ,ed but did not occur. The ACLU .nounced it would not make an appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court, and Davis was widely quoted in the press as saying "Let's just get it over with." Thus the election proceeded as planned on October 7.

Polling

Public opinion was divided on the recall, with many passionately-held positions on both sides of the recall election. Californians were fairly united in their disapproval of Governor Davis's handling of the state, with his approval numbers in the mid-20s. On the question of whether he should be recalled, Californians were more divided, but polls in the weeks leading up to the election consistently showed that a majority would vote to remove him.

Polls also showed that the two leading candidates, Lt. Governor Cruz Bustamante, a Democrat, and Hollywood actor Arnold Schwarzenegger, a Republican, were neck and neck with about 25–35% of the vote each, and Bustamante with a slight lead in most polls. Republican State Senator Tom McClintock also polled in the double-digits. Remaining candidates polled in the low single digits. Polls in the final week leading up to the election showed support for Davis slipping and support for Schwarzenegger growing.

Many observers outside California, and some members of the press, consistently called the recall chaos and madness as well as a media circus and nightmare. With the candidacies of a few celebrities and many regular Californians, the entire affair became a joke to some (there were tongue-in-cheek references to Schwarzenegger's role in the science fiction film *Total Recall*) as well as an "only-in-California" event. Nevertheless, most Californians took the recall seriously, with the future of the governor's office at stake. In the months before the election, 380,000 Californians registered to vote, for a total of 15.3 million—more registered voters than there had been in the three previous presidential elections.[32]

Results

The October 7 ballot had two questions.

The first question was whether Davis, the sitting governor, should be recalled; those voting on it were 55.4% in favor of recall and 44.6% opposed.

The second question was who would replace the governor in the event that a majority voted to recall him. Among those voting on the potential replacement, Schwarzenegger received a plurality of 48.6%, by surpassing Lt. Gov. Cruz Bustamante's 31.5% – about a 3-to-2 ratio. Republican Tom McClintock received 13.4% of the vote – less than half the share of the candidate he trailed. Green Party candidate Peter Camejo polled 2.8%, trailing the third-place candidate by almost four-to-one. Each remaining candidate polled 0.6% or less.

Schwarzenegger's votes exceeded those for the next five candidates combined, despite the presumed division of Republican voters between him and McClintock. There were also more votes for Schwarzenegger (4,206,284) than votes against recalling Davis (4,007,783), avoiding the theoretical scenario of the replacement having less support than the recalled governor.

At 10 p.m. local time, Davis conceded that he had lost to Schwarzenegger, saying, "We've had a lot of good nights over the last 20 years, but tonight the people did decide that it's time for someone else to serve, and I accept their judgment." About 40 minutes later, in his acceptance speech, Schwarzenegger

said, "Today California has given me the greatest gift of all: You've given me your trust by voting for me. I will do everything I can to live up to that trust. I will not fail you."

Following the election, all 58 of California's counties had 28 days (until November 4, 2003) each to conduct a countywide canvass of their votes. Counties used this time to count any absentee ballots or provisional ballots not yet counted, to reconcile the number of signatures on the roster of registered voters with the number of ballots recorded on the ballot statement, to count any valid write-in votes, to reproduce any damaged ballots, if necessary, and to conduct a hand count of the ballots cast in 1% of the precincts, chosen at random by the elections official. Counties then had seven days from the conclusion of canvassing (November 11, 2003, 35 days after the election) to submit their final vote totals to the California Secretary of State's office. The Secretary of State had to certify the final statewide vote by 39 days (until November 15) after the election.

The vote was officially certified on November 14, 2003. Once the vote was certified, governor-elect Schwarzenegger had to be sworn into office within ten days.[33] His inauguration took place on November 17, 2003.

Key: Withdrew prior to contest

California gubernatorial recall election, 2003[34][35]

Vote on recall	Votes	Percentage
✓ Yes	**4,976,274**	**55.4%**
No	4,007,783	44.6%
Invalid or blank votes	429,431	4.6%
Totals	**9,413,488**	**100.0%**
Voter turnout		61.2%

Rank	Party	Candidate	Votes	Percentage
1	**Republican**	**Arnold Schwarzenegger**	**4,206,284**	**48.6%**
2	Democratic	Cruz Bustamante	2,724,874	31.5%
3	Republican	Tom McClintock	1,161,287	13.4%
	All other listed and write-in candidates (see below for details)		275,719	3.2%
4	Green	Peter Camejo	242,247	2.8%
5	Independent	Arianna Huffington[37]	47,505	0.5%
6	Republican	Peter Ueberroth[38]	25,134	0.3%
7	Democratic	Larry Flynt	17,458	0.2%
8	Independent	Gary Coleman	14,242	0.2%
9	Independent	George B. Schwartzman	12,382	0.1%
10	Independent	Mary Carey	11,179	0.1%
11	Democratic	Bruce Margolin	9,188	0.1%
12	Republican	Bill Simon[39]	8,913	0.1%
13	Republican	Van Vo	7,226	0.1%
14	Independent	John Christopher Burton	6,748	0.1%
15	Democratic	David Laughing Horse Robinson	6,496	0.1%
16	Independent	Leo Gallagher	5,466	0.1%
17	Republican	Cheryl Bly-Chester	5,297	0.1%
18	Democratic	Lawrence Strauss	5,245	0.1%
19	Democratic	Ronald Palmieri	4,221	0.1%
20	Democratic	Calvin Louie	3,906	0.1%
21	Independent	Badi Badiozamani	3,404	<0.1%
22	Democratic	Audie Bock	3,358	<0.1%
23	Democratic	Ralph Hernandez	3,199	<0.1%
24	Democratic	Edward Kennedy	3,007	<0.1%
25	Democratic	Dan Feinstein	2,927	<0.1%
26	Independent	Bob McClain	2,857	<0.1%
27	Democratic	James Green	2,848	<0.1%

28	Democratic	Jarrett Gruener	2,562	<0.1%
29	Independent	Angelyne	2,536	<0.1%
30	Democratic	Paul Mariano	2,455	<0.1%
31	Green	Ivan Hall	2,346	<0.1%
32	Democratic	Jim Weir	2,328	<0.1%
33	Independent	Jerome Kunzman	2,317	<0.1%
34	Libertarian	Ned Roscoe	2,250	<0.1%
35	Democratic	Georgina Russell	2,216	<0.1%
36	Democratic	Jonathan Miller	2,214	<0.1%
37	Independent	Jack Grisham	2,200	<0.1%
38	Democratic	Christopher Sproul	2,039	<0.1%
39	Green	Daniel Watts	2,021	<0.1%
40	Libertarian	Ken Hamidi	1,948	<0.1%
41	Democratic	Marc Valdez	1,840	<0.1%
42	Democratic	Frank Macaluso	1,801	<0.1%
43	Democratic	Daniel Ramirez	1,778	<0.1%
44	Republican	Randall Sprague	1,771	<0.1%
45	Independent	Brooke Adams	1,713	<0.1%
46	Independent	Mohammad Arif	1,709	<0.1%
47	Independent	Nathan Walton	1,697	<0.1%
48	Libertarian	John Hickey	1,689	<0.1%
49	Democratic	Mike Schmier	1,652	<0.1%
50	Peace and Freedom	C.T. Weber	1,626	<0.1%
51	Democratic	Diana Foss	1,577	<0.1%
52	Democratic	Michael Wozniak	1,562	<0.1%
53	Independent	B.E. Smith	1,545	<0.1%
54	Democratic	Lingel Winters	1,466	<0.1%
55	Independent	Richard Simmons	1,422	<0.1%
56	Democratic	Joe Guzzardi	1,419	<0.1%
57	Independent	Mike McCarthy	1,351	<0.1%
58	Democratic	Art Brown	1,344	<0.1%
59	Independent	Leonard Padilla	1,343	<0.1%
60	Natural Law	Iris Adam	1,297	<0.1%
61	Green	Maurice Walker	1,236	<0.1%
62	Independent	Trek Kelly	1,210	<0.1%
63	Democratic	Vikramjit Bajwa	1,168	<0.1%
64	Republican	David Sams	1,166	<0.1%
65	Natural Law	Darin Price	1,152	<0.1%

66	American Independent	Charles Pineda	1,104	<0.1%
67	Democratic	John Mortensen	1,078	<0.1%
68	Independent	Sara Hanlon	1,077	<0.1%
69	American Independent	Diane Templin	1,067	<0.1%
70	Democratic	Dick Lane	1,065	<0.1%
71	Republican	Jim Hoffmann	1,046	<0.1%
72	Democratic	William Vaughn	1,028	<0.1%
73	Independent	C. Stephen Henderson	989	<0.1%
74	Republican	Robert Newman	987	<0.1%
75	Republican	Jamie Safford	943	<0.1%
76	Democratic	Robert Mannheim	914	<0.1%
77	Republican	Dorene Musilli	907	<0.1%
78	Democratic	Scott Mednick	903	<0.1%
79	Democratic	A. Lavar Taylor	851	<0.1%
80	Independent	Brian Tracy	842	<0.1%
81	Independent	Kurt Rightmyer	837	<0.1%
82	Democratic	Christopher Ranken	823	<0.1%
83	Independent	Sharon Rushford	821	<0.1%
84	Democratic	Darrin Scheidle	814	<0.1%
85	Independent	Patricia Tilley	792	<0.1%
86	Independent	Darryl Mobley	778	<0.1%
87	Republican	Alex-St. James	771	<0.1%
88	Democratic	Bob Edwards	758	<0.1%
89	Republican	Douglas Anderson	754	<0.1%
90	Independent	Joel Britton	751	<0.1%
91	Republican	Michael Jackson	746	<0.1%
92	Republican	Ed Beyer	727	<0.1%
93	Democratic	Paul Mailander	715	<0.1%
94	Republican	John Beard	699	<0.1%
95	Democratic	Paul Nave	679	<0.1%
96	Democratic	Robert Cullenbine	632	<0.1%
97	Democratic	Warren Farrell	626	<0.1%
98	Republican	Chuck Walker	623	<0.1%
99	Republican	William Chambers	610	<0.1%
100	Republican	Vip Bhola	607	<0.1%
101	Democratic	Gerold Lee Gorman	598	<0.1%
102	Republican	Dennis McMahon	591	<0.1%

103	Republican	ames Vandeventer	588	<0.1%
104	Democratic	Eric Korevaar	586	<0.1%
105	Democratic	Kelly Kimball	582	<0.1%
106	Republican	Mike McNeilly	581	<0.1%
107	Republican	S. Issa	554	<0.1%
108	Republican	Gino Martorana	532	<0.1%
109	Republican	Richard Gosse	497	0.0%
110	Democratic	Tim Sylvester	489	0.0%
111(t)	Democratic	Bill Prady	474	0.0%
111(t)	Republican	Bryan Quinn	474	0.0%
113	Republican	Jeffrey Mock	455	0.0%
114	Republican	Paul Vann	452	0.0%
115	Independent	Michael Cheli	451	0.0%
116	Republican	Heather Peters	444	0.0%
117	Independent	Jeff Rainforth	425	0.0%
118	Independent	Ronald Friedman	419	0.0%
119	Republican	Todd Carson	386	0.0%
120	Independent	Scott Davis[40][41]	384	0.0%
121	Republican	Daniel Richards	383	0.0%
122	Republican	Carl Mehr	376	0.0%
123	Democratic	Lorraine Fontanes	365	0.0%
124	Democratic	Gary Leonard	359	0.0%
125	Republican	Gregory Pawlik	349	0.0%
126	Republican	Jon Zellhoefer	346	0.0%
127	Republican	Reva Renz	333	0.0%
128	Republican	Kevin Richter	305	0.0%
129	Republican	Stephen Knapp	298	0.0%
130	Republican	William Tsangares	281	0.0%
131	Republican	Logan Clements	274	0.0%
132	Republican	Robert Dole	273	0.0%
133	Democratic	David Kessinger	261	0.0%
134	Republican	Gene Forte	235	0.0%
135	Independent	Todd Lewis	192	0.0%
136	Independent	Mathilda Spak (write-in)	16	0.0%
137(t)	Republican	Jason Gastrich (write-in)	11	0.0%
137(t)	Democratic	Monty Manibog (write-in)	11	0.0%
139(t)	Independent	Thomas Benigno (write-in)	7	0.0%
139(t)	Independent	R. Charlie Chadwick (write-in)	7	0.0%

141(t)		Independent	Shirley Coly (write-in)	5	0.0%
141(t)		Democratic	Jane Dawson (write-in)	5	0.0%
143(t)		Democratic	Pauline Cooper (write-in)	4	0.0%
143(t)		Independent	Paul Walton (write-in)	4	0.0%
145(t)		Republican	Jim Trenton (write-in)	3	0.0%
145(t)		Democratic	Wignes Warren (write-in)	3	0.0%
147(t)		Independent	Christy Cassel (write-in)	2	0.0%
147(t)		Republican	Jacques-André Istel (write-in)	2	0.0%
147(t)		Democratic	Christian Meister (write-in)	2	0.0%
147(t)		Independent	Vincent Pallaver (write-in)	2	0.0%
147(t)		Democratic	Lincoln Pickard (write-in)	2	0.0%
147(t)		Democratic	Lynda Toth (write-in)	2	0.0%
147(t)		Republican	Donald Wang (write-in)	2	0.0%
154(t)		Democratic	Robert Gibb (write-in)	1	0.0%
154(t)		Independent	Ronald Spangler (write-in)	1	0.0%
154(t)		Independent	Kyle Conover (write-in)	1	0.0%
154(t)		Democratic	Bill Thill (write-in)	1	0.0%
154(t)		Democratic	Jurlene White (write-in)	1	0.0%
154(t)		Republican	Joel Wirth (write-in)	1	0.0%
			Invalid or blank votes	755,575	8.0%
			Totals	**9,413,491**	**100.0%**
			Voter turnout		61.2%
	Republican **gain** from Democratic				

Note that San Bernardino County did not report write-in votes for individual candidates.[35]

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- 1921 North Dakota gubernatorial recall election
- 2021 California gubernatorial recall election

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Political party

A **political party** is an organization that coordinates candidates to compete in a country's elections. It is common for the members of a political party to have similar ideas about politics, and parties may promote specific ideological or policy goals.



The members of political parties coordinate to collectively achieve and use political power.

Political parties have become a major part of the politics of almost every country, as modern party organizations developed and spread around the world over the last few centuries. Some countries have only one political party while others have dozens, but it is extremely rare for a country to have no political parties. Parties are important in the politics of autocracies as well as democracies, though usually democracies have more political parties than autocracies. Autocracies often have a single party that governs the country, and some political scientists consider competition between two or more parties to be an essential part of democracy.

Parties can develop from existing divisions in society, like the divisions between lower and upper classes, and they streamline the process of making political decisions by encouraging their members to cooperate. Political parties usually include a party leader, who has primary responsibility for the activities of the party; party executives, who may select the leader and who perform administrative and organizational tasks; and party members, who may volunteer to help the party, donate money to it, and vote for its candidates. There are many different ways in which political parties can be structured and interact with the electorate. The contributions that citizens give to political parties are often regulated by law, and parties will sometimes govern in a way that favours the people who donate time and money to them.

Many political parties are motivated by ideological goals. It is common for democratic elections to feature competitions between liberal, conservative, and socialist parties; other common ideologies of very large political parties include communism, populism, nationalism, and Islamism. Political parties in different countries will often adopt similar colours and symbols to identify themselves with a particular ideology. However, many political parties have no ideological affiliation, and may instead be primarily engaged in patronage, clientelism, or the advancement of a specific political entrepreneur.

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References

Definition

Political parties are collective entities that organize competitions for political offices.[1]:3 The members of a political party contest elections under a shared label. In a narrow definition, a political party can be thought of as just the group of candidates who run for office under a party label.[2]:3 In a broader definition, political parties are the entire apparatus that supports the election of a group of candidates, including voters and volunteers who identify with a particular political party, the official party organizations that support the election of that party's candidates, and legislators in the government who are affiliated with the party.[3]

Political parties are distinguished from other political groups and clubs, such as political factions or interest groups, mostly by the fact that parties are focused on electing candidates whereas interest groups are focused on advancing a policy agenda.[4] This is related to other features that sometimes

distinguish parties from other p tical organizations, including a la r membership, greater stability over time, and deeper connection to the electorate.[5]

In many countries the notion of a political party is defined in law, and governments may specify requirements for an organization to legally qualify as a political party.[6]

In some definitions of political parties, a party is an organization that advances a specific set of ideological or policy goals, or that organizes people whose ideas about politics are similar.[7] However, many political parties are not primarily motivated by ideology or policy; for example, political parties can be mainly clientelistic or patronage-based organizations, or tools for advancing the career of a specific political entrepreneur.[8][9][10]


History

The idea of people forming large groups or factions to advocate for their shared interests is ancient. Plato mentions the political factions of Classical Athens in *the Republic*,[11] and Aristotle discusses the tendency of different types of government to produce factions in *the Politics*.[12] Certain ancient disputes were also factional, like the Nika riots between two chariot racing factions at the Hippodrome of Constantinople. A few instances of recorded political groups or factions in history included the late Roman Republic's *Populares* and *Optimates* faction as well as the Dutch Republic's *Orangists* and the *Staatsgezinde*. However, modern political parties are considered to have emerged around the end of the 18th century; they are usually considered to have first appeared in Europe and the United States, with the United Kingdom's Conservative Party, Poland's Famillia party and the Democratic Party of the United States all of which except for Poland's are frequently called the world's "oldest continuous political party".[13][2][14][15]

Before the development of mass political parties, elections typically featured a much lower level of competitiveness, had small enough polities that direct decision-making was feasible, and held elections that were dominated by individual networks or cliques that could independently propel a candidate to victory in an election.[16]:510

18th century

Some scholars argue that the first modern political parties developed in early modern Britain in the 18th century, after the Exclusion Crisis and the Glorious Revolution.[17]:4 The Whig faction originally organized itself around support for Protestant constitutional monarchy as opposed to absolute rule, whereas the conservative Tory faction (originally the Royalist or Cavalier faction of the English Civil War) supported a strong monarchy, and these two groups structured disputes in the politics of the United Kingdom throughout the 18th century[17]:4[18] The Rockingham Whigs have been identified as the first modern political party, because they retained a coherent party label and motivating principles even while out of power.[19]



In *A Block for the Wigs* (1783), James Gillray caricatured Fox's return to power in a coalition with North. George III is the blockhead in the centre.

At the end of the late 18th century, the United States also developed a party system, called the First Party System. Although the framers of the 1787 United States Constitution did not all anticipate that American political

disputes would be primarily organized around political parties, political controversies in the early 1790s over the extent of federal government powers saw the emergence of two proto-political parties: the Federalist Party and the Democratic-Republican Party.[20][21]

19th century

By the early 19th century, a number of countries had developed stable modern party systems. The party system that developed in Sweden has been called the world's first party system, on the basis that previous party systems were not fully stable or institutionalized.[13] In many European countries, including Belgium, Switzerland, Germany, and France, political parties organized around a liberal-conservative divide, or around religious disputes.[16]:510 The spread of the party model of politics was accelerated by the 1848 Revolutions around Europe.[22]

The strength of political parties in the United States waned during the Era of Good Feelings, but shifted and strengthened again by the second half of the 19th century.[23][24] By the end of the 19th century, the Irish political leader Charles Stewart Parnell had implemented several methods and structures that would come to be associated with strong grassroots political parties, such as explicit party discipline.[25]

20th century


At the beginning of the 20th century in Europe, the liberal-conservative divide that characterized most party systems was disrupted by the emergence of socialist parties, which attracted the support of organized trade unions.[16]:511

During the wave of decolonization in the mid-20th century, many newly sovereign countries developed party systems that often emerged out of their movements for independence.[26][27] For example, a system of political parties arose out of factions in the Indian independence movement, and was strengthened and stabilized by the policies of Indira Gandhi in the 1970s.[2]:165 The formation of the Indian National Congress, which developed in the early 20th century as a pro-independence faction in British India and immediately became a major political party after Indian independence, foreshadowed the dynamic in many newly independent countries; for example, the Uganda National Congress was a pro-independence party and the first political party in Uganda, and its name was chosen as an homage to the Indian National Congress.[28] A similar pattern occurred in many countries at the end of colonial periods.

Why political parties exist

Political parties are a nearly ubiquitous feature of modern countries.[29] Nearly all democratic countries have strong political parties, and many political scientists consider countries with fewer than two parties to necessarily be autocratic.[30][31][32] However, these sources allow that a country with multiple competitive parties is not necessarily democratic, and the politics of many autocratic countries are organized around one dominant political party.[32][33] The ubiquity and strength of political parties in nearly every modern country has led researchers to remark that the existence of political parties is almost a law of politics, and to ask why parties appear to be such an essential part of modern states.[16]:510[1] Political scientists have therefore come up with several explanations for why political parties are a nearly universal political phenomenon.[2]:11

Social cleavages



Political parties like the Romanian Communist Party can arise out of, or be closely connected to, existing segments of society, such as organizations of workers.

One of the core explanations for why political parties exist is that they arise from pre-existing divisions among people: society is divided in a certain way, and a party is formed to organize that division into electoral competition. By the 1950s, economists and political scientists had shown that party organizations can take advantage of the distribution of voters' preferences over political issues, adjusting themselves in response to what voters believe in order to become more competitive.[34][35] Beginning in the 1960s, academics began identifying the social cleavages in different countries that might have given rise to specific parties, such as religious cleavages in specific countries that may have produced religious parties there.[36][37]

The theory that parties are produced by social cleavages has drawn several criticisms. Some authors have challenged it on empirical grounds, either finding no evidence for the claim that parties emerge from existing cleavages, or arguing that the claim is not empirically testable.[38] Others note that while social cleavages might cause political parties to exist, this obscures the opposite effect: that political parties also cause changes in the underlying social cleavages.[2]:13 A further objection is that, if the explanation for where parties come from is that they emerge from existing social cleavages, then the theory is an incomplete story of where political parties come from unless it also explains where social cleavages come from. But origins of social cleavages have also been proposed: one argument is that social cleavages are formed by historical conflicts.[39]

Individual and group incentives



It is easier for voters to evaluate one simple list of policies for each party, like this platform for the United Australia Party, than to individually judge every single candidate.

An alternative explanation for why parties are ubiquitous across the world is that the formation of parties provides compatible incentives for candidates and legislators. For example, the existence of political parties might coordinate candidates across geographic districts, so that a candidate in one electoral district has an incentive to assist a similar candidate in a different district.[1] So political parties can be mechanisms for preventing candidates with similar goals from acting to each other's detriment when campaigning or governing.[40] This might help explain the ubiquity of parties because, if a group of candidates form a party and are harming each other less, they may perform better over the long run than unaffiliated politicians, so politicians with party affiliations will out-compete politicians without parties.[1]

Parties can also align their member's incentives when those members are in a legislature.[41] The existence of a party apparatus can help coalitions of electors to agree on ideal policy choices,[42] whereas a legislature of unaffiliated members might never be able to agree on a single best policy choice without some institution constraining their options.[43][44]


Parties as heuristics

Another prominent explanation for why political parties exist is psychological: parties may be necessary for many individuals to participate in politics because they provide a massively simplifying heuristic, which allows people to make informed choices with much less mental effort.[45] Without political parties, electors would have to individually evaluate every candidate in every election. But political parties enable electors to make judgments about just a few groups, and then apply their judgment of the party to all the candidates affiliated with that group. Because it is much easier to become informed about a few parties' platforms than about many candidates' personal positions, parties reduce the cognitive burden for people to cast informed votes. However, evidence suggests that over the last several decades the strength of party identification has been weakening, so this may be a less important function for parties to provide than it was in the past.[46]

Structure of political parties

Political parties are often structured in similar ways across countries. They typically feature a single party leader, a group of party executives, and a community of party members.[47] Parties in democracies usually select their party leadership in ways that are more open and competitive than parties in autocracies, where the selection of a new party leader is likely to be tightly controlled.[48] In countries with large sub-national regions, particularly federalist countries, there may be regional party leaders and regional party members in addition to the national membership and leadership.[2]:75

Party leaders



A National Congress of the Communist Party of China, where policies may be set and changes can be made to party leadership.


Parties are typically led by a party leader, who is the main representative of the party and often has primary responsibility for overseeing the party's policies and strategies. The leader of the party that controls the government usually becomes the head of government, such as the president or prime minister, and the leaders of other parties explicitly compete to become the head of government.[47] In both presidential democracies and parliamentary democracies, the members of a party frequently have substantial input into the selection of party leaders, for example by voting on party leadership at a party conference.[49][50] Because the leader of a major party is a powerful and visible person, many party leaders are well-known career politicians.[51] Party leaders can be sufficiently prominent that they affect how voters perceive the entire political party,[52] and some voters decide how to vote in elections partly based on how much they like the leaders of the different parties.[53]

The number of people involved in choosing party leaders varies widely across parties and countries. On one extreme, party leaders might be selected from the entire electorate; on the opposite extreme, they might be selected by just one individual.[54] Selection by a smaller group can be a feature of party leadership transitions in more autocratic countries, where the existence of political parties may be severely constrained to only one legal political party, or only one competitive party. Some of these parties, like the Chinese Communist Party, have rigid methods for selecting the next party leader, which involve selection by other party members.[55] A small number of single-party states have hereditary succession, where party leadership is inherited by the child of an outgoing party leader.[56] Autocratic parties use more restrictive selection methods to avoid having major shifts in the regime as a result of successions.[48]

Party executives

In both democratic and non-democratic countries, the party leader is often the foremost member of a larger party leadership. A party executive will commonly include administrative positions, like a party secretary and a party chair, who may be different people from the party leader.[57][58] These executive organizations may serve to constrain the party leader, especially if that leader is an autocrat.[59][60] It is common for political parties to conduct major leadership decisions, like selecting a party executive and setting their policy goals, during regular party conferences.[61]

Much as party leaders who are not in power are usually at least nominally competing to become the head of government, the entire party executive may be competing for various positions in the government. For example, in Westminster systems, the largest party that is out of power will form the Official Opposition in parliament, and select a shadow cabinet which (among other functions) provides a signal about which members of the party would hold which positions in the government if the party were to win an election.[62]



Members of the National Woman's Party in 1918.

Party membership

Citizens in a democracy will often affiliate with a political party. Party membership may include paying dues, an agreement not to affiliate with multiple parties at the same time, and sometimes a statement of agreement with the party's policies and platform.[63] In democratic countries, members of political parties often are allowed to participate in elections to choose the party leadership.[54] Party members may form the base of the volunteer activists and donors who support political parties during campaigns.[64] The extent of participation in party organizations can be affected by a country's political institutions, with certain electoral systems and party systems encouraging higher party membership.[65] Since at least the 1980s, membership in large traditional party organizations has been steadily declining across a number of countries.[66]

Types of party organizations

Political scientists have distinguished between different types of political parties that have evolved throughout history. These include cadre parties, mass parties, catch-all parties and cartel parties.[67]:163–178 Cadre parties were political elites that were concerned with contesting elections and restricted the influence of outsiders, who were only required to assist in election campaigns. Mass parties tried to recruit new members who were a source of party income and were often expected to spread party ideology as well as assist in elections. In the United States, where both major parties were cadre parties, the introduction of primaries and other reforms has transformed them so that power is held by activists who compete over influence and nomination of candidates.[68]

Cadre parties

A cadre party, or elite party, is a type of political party that was dominant in the nineteenth century before the introduction of universal suffrage and that was made up of a collection of individuals or political elites. The French political scientist Maurice Duverger first distinguished between "cadre" and "mass" parties, founding his distinction on the differences within the organisational structures of these

two types.[69]:60–71 Cadre parties are characterized by minimal and loose organisation, and are financed by fewer larger monetary contributions typically originating from outside the party. Cadre parties give little priority to expanding the party's membership base, and its leaders are its only members.[70][67]:165 The earliest parties, such as the early American political parties, the Democratic-Republicans and the Federalists, are classified as cadre parties.[71]

Mass parties

A mass party is a type of political party that developed around cleavages in society and mobilized the ordinary citizens or 'masses' in the political process.[71] In Europe, the introduction of universal suffrage resulted in the creation of worker's parties that later evolved into mass parties; an example is the German Social Democratic Party.[67]:165 These parties represented large groups of citizens who had previously not been represented in political processes, articulating the interests of different groups in society. In contrast to cadre parties, mass parties are funded by their members, and rely on and maintain a large membership base. Further, mass parties prioritize the mobilization of voters and are more centralized than cadre parties.[71][72]



Parties can arise from existing cleavages in society, like the Social Democratic Party of Germany which was formed to represent German workers.

Catch-all parties

The term "Catch-all party" was developed by German-American political scientist Otto Kirchheimer to describe the parties that developed in the 1950s and 1960s as a result of changes within the mass parties.[73][67]:165 The term "big tent party" may be used interchangeably. Kirchheimer characterized the shift from the traditional mass parties to catch-all parties as a set of developments including the "drastic reduction of the party's ideological baggage" and the "downgrading of the role of the individual party member".[74] By broadening their central ideologies into more open-ended ones, catch-all parties seek to secure the support of a wider section of the population. Further, the role of members is reduced as catch-all parties are financed in part by the state or by donations.[67]:163–178 In Europe, the shift of Christian Democratic parties that were organized around religion into broader centre-right parties epitomizes this type.[75]

Cartel parties

Cartel parties are a type of political party that emerged post-1970s and are characterized by heavy state financing and the diminished role of ideology as an organizing principle. The cartel party thesis was developed by Richard Katz and Peter Mair who wrote that political parties have turned into "semi-state agencies",[76] acting on behalf of the state rather than groups in society. The term 'cartel' refers to the way in which prominent parties in government make it difficult for new parties to enter, as such forming a cartel of established parties. As with catch-all parties, the role of members in cartel parties is largely insignificant as parties use the resources of the state to maintain their position within the political system.[67]:163–178

Niche parties

Niche parties are a type of political party that developed on the basis of the emergence of new cleavages and issues in politics, such as immigration and the environment.[77] In contrast to mainstream or catch-all parties, niche parties articulate an often limited set of interests in a way that does not conform to the dominant economic left-right divide in politics, emphasising issues that do not attain prominence within the other parties.[78] Further, niche parties do not respond to changes in public opinion to the extent that mainstream parties do. Examples of niche parties include Green parties and extreme nationalist parties, such as the Front National in France.[79] However, over time these parties may lose some of their niche qualities, instead adopting those of mainstream parties, for example after entering government.[78]



A political party may focus on one niche issue, like the environment.

Entrepreneurial parties

Entrepreneurial parties are a type of political party that is centered on a political entrepreneur, and dedicated to the advancement of that person or their policies.[80]


Party positions and ideologies

Political ideologies are one of the major organizing features of political parties, and parties often officially align themselves with specific ideologies. Parties adopt ideologies for a number of reasons. Ideological affiliations for political parties send signals about what sort of policies they might pursue if they were in power.[81] Ideologies also differentiate parties from one another, so that voters can select the party that advances the policies that they most prefer.[82] A party may also seek to advance an ideology, by convincing voters to adopt its belief system.[83]


Ideology of ruling party in legislative body at the regional or national level worldwide, or ideology of ruling body, as of May 2020. Colour-coded from left- (red) to right- (blue) wing scale. Based on identification from international recognition or self-proclaimed party ideology.

Common ideologies that can form a central part of the identity of a political party include liberalism, conservatism, socialism, communism, anarchism, fascism, feminism, environmentalism, nationalism, fundamentalism,[84] Islamism, and multiculturalism.[85] Liberalism is the ideology that is most closely connected to the history of democracies and is often considered to be the dominant or default ideology of governing parties in much of the contemporary world.[86] Many of the traditional competitors to liberal parties are conservative parties.[86] Socialist, communist, anarchist, fascist, and nationalist parties are more recent developments, largely entering political competitions only in the 19th and 20th centuries.[86] Feminism, environmentalism, multiculturalism, and certain types of fundamentalism became prominent towards the end of the 20th century.[86]

Parties can sometimes be organized according to their ideology using an economic left–right political spectrum. However, a simple left-right economic axis does not fully capture the variation in party ideologies.[87] Other common axes that are used to compare the ideologies of political parties include ranges from liberal to authoritarian,[88] from pro-establishment to anti-establishment, and from tolerant to pluralistic.[87]




Though ideologies are central to a large number of political parties around the world, not all political parties have an organizing ideology, or exist to promote ideological policies. For example, some political parties may be clientelistic or patronage-based organizations, which are largely concerned with distributing goods.[9] Other political parties may be created as tools for the advancement of an individual politician.[10][89] Either of these types of parties may also be ideological, but parties can exist which are not ideological.[8]

Party systems

Political parties are ubiquitous across both democratic and autocratic countries, and there is often very little change in which political parties have a chance of holding power in a country from one election to the next. This makes it possible to think about the political parties in a country as collectively forming one of the country's central political institutions, called a party system.[90] Some basic features of a party system are how many parties there are and what sorts of parties are the most successful.[91] These properties are closely connected to other major features of the country's politics, like how democratic it is, what sorts of restrictions its laws impose on political parties, and what type of electoral systems it uses.[90] An informative way to classify the party systems of the world is by how many parties they include.[91] Because some party systems include a large number of parties that have a very low probability of winning elections, it is often useful to think about the effective number of parties (the number of parties weighted by the strength of those parties) rather than the literal number of registered parties.[92]

Non-partisan systems

In a non-partisan system, no political parties exist, or political parties are not a major part of the political system. There are very few countries without political parties.[93] A permanent absence of parties is usually, but not always, the result of an official ban on partisan activity. A temporary lack of partisan activity can also occur during an upheaval in a country's politics.



In a non-partisan legislature, like the Legislative Assembly of the Northwest Territories, every member runs and legislates as a political independent with no party affiliation.

In some non-partisan countries, the formation of parties is explicitly banned by law.[94] The existence of political parties may be banned in autocratic countries in order to prevent a turnover in power.[95] For example, in Saudi Arabia, a ban on political parties has been used as a tool for protecting the monarchy.[95] However, parties are also banned in some polities that have long democratic histories, usually in local or regional elections of countries that have strong national party systems.[96][97][98]

Political parties may also temporarily cease to exist in countries that have either only been established recently, or have experienced a major upheaval in their politics and have not yet returned to a stable system of political parties. For example, the United States began as a non-partisan democracy, and it evolved a stable system of political

parties over the course of many decades.[1]:ch.4 A country's party system may also dissolve and take time to re-form, leaving a period of minimal or no party system, such as in Peru following the regime of Alberto Fujimori.[99] However, it is also possible (though rare) for countries with no bans on political parties, and which have not experienced a major disruption, to nevertheless have no political parties: there are a small number of pacific island democracies, such as Palau, where political parties are permitted to exist and yet parties are not an important part of national politics.[94]


One-party systems

In a one-party system, power is held entirely by one political party. When only one political party exists, it may be the result of a ban on the formation of any competing political parties, which is a common feature in authoritarian states. For example, the Communist Party of Cuba is the only permitted political party in Cuba, and is the only party that can hold seats in the legislature.[100] When only one powerful party is legally permitted to exist, its membership can grow to contain a very large portion of society and it can play substantial roles in civil society that are not necessarily directly related to political governance; one example of this is the Chinese Communist Party.[101] Bans on competing parties can also ensure that only one party can ever realistically hold power, even without completely outlawing all other political parties. For example, in North Korea, more than one party is officially permitted to exist and even to seat members in the legislature,[102] but laws ensure that the Workers' Party of Korea retains control.[103]

It is also possible for countries with free elections to have only one party that holds power. These cases are sometimes called dominant-party systems or particracies. Scholars have debated whether or not a country that has never experienced a transfer of power from one party to another can nevertheless be considered a democracy.[30]:23 There have been periods of government exclusively or entirely by one party in some countries that are often considered to have been democratic, and which had no official legal barriers to the inclusion of other parties in the government; this includes recent periods in Botswana, Japan, Mexico, Senegal, and South Africa.[30]:24–27 It can also occur that one political party dominates a sub-national region of a democratic country that has a competitive national party system; one example is the southern United States during much of the 19th and 20th centuries, where the Democratic Party had almost complete control.[104]

Two-party systems

In several countries, there are only two parties that have a realistic chance of competing to form government.[105] One canonical two-party democracy is the United States, where the national government is exclusively controlled by either the Democratic Party and the Republican Party.[106] Other examples of countries which have had long periods of two-party dominance include Colombia, Uruguay,[107] Malta,[108] and Ghana.[109]



The United States has one of the main examples of a two-party system.


It is also possible for authoritarian countries, and not just democracies, to have two-party systems. Competition between two parties has occurred in historical autocratic regimes in countries including Brazil[110] and Venezuela.[111]

In the 1960s Maurice Duverger observed that single-member district single-vote plurality-rule elections tend to produce two-party systems,[69]:217 a phenomenon that became known as Duverger's law. Whether or not this pattern is true has been heavily debated over the last several decades.[112]

E 11 27

Multi-party systems

Multi-party systems are systems in which more than two parties have a realistic chance of holding power and influencing policy.[107] A very large number of systems around the world have had periods of multi-party competition,[113] and two-party democracies may be considered unusual or uncommon compared to multi-party systems.[114] Many of the largest democracies in the world have had long periods of multi-party competition, including India,[115] Indonesia,[116] Pakistan,[117] and Brazil.[118] Multiparty systems encourage characteristically different types of governance than smaller party systems, for example by often encouraging the formation of coalition governments.[119]



On this 2012 Mexican ballot, voters have more than two parties to choose from.

The presence of many competing political parties is usually associated with a greater level of democracy, and a country transitioning from having a one-party system to having a many-party system is often considered to be democratizing.[120] Authoritarian countries can include multi-party competition, but typically this occurs when the elections are not fair.[121] For this reason, in two-party democracies like the United States, proponents of forming new competitive political parties often argue that developing a multi-party system would make the country more democratic.[122] However, the question of whether multiparty systems are more democratic than two-party systems, or if they enjoy better policy outcomes, is a subject of substantial disagreement among scholars[123][124] as well as among the public.[125][126] In the opposite extreme, a country with a very large number of parties can experience governing coalitions that include highly ideologically diverse parties that are unable to make much policy progress, which may cause the country to be unstable and experience a very large number of elections; examples of systems that have been described as having these problems include periods in the recent history of Israel,[127] Italy, and Finland.[128]

Some multi-party systems may have two parties that are noticeably more competitive than the other parties.[129] Such party systems have been called "two-party-plus" systems, which refers to the two dominant parties, plus other parties that exist but rarely or never hold power in the government.[130] It is also possible for very large multi-party systems, like India's, to nevertheless be characterized largely by a series of regional contests that realistically have only two competitive parties, but in the aggregate can produce many more than 2 parties that have major roles in the country's national politics.[115]


Funding

Many of the activities of political parties involve acquiring funds and allocating them in order to achieve political goals. The funding involved can be very substantial, with contemporary elections in the largest democracies typically costing billions or even tens of billions of dollars.[131][132] Much of this expense is paid by candidates and political parties, which often develop sophisticated fundraising organizations.[133] Because paying for participation in electoral contests is such a central democratic activity, the funding of political parties is an important feature of a country's politics.[133]

Sources of party funds

Common sources of party funding across countries include dues-paying party members, advocacy groups and lobbying organizations, corporations, trade unions, and candidates who may self-fund activities.[134] In most countries, the government also provides some level of funding for political

parties.[133][135] Nearly all of the 180 countries examined by the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance have some form of public funding for political parties, and about a third of them have regular payments of government funds that goes beyond campaign reimbursements.[136] In some countries public funding for parties depends on the size of that party, for example a country may only provide funding to parties which have more than a certain number of candidates or supporters.[136] A common argument for public funding of political parties is that it creates fairer and more democratic elections by enabling more groups to compete, whereas many advocates for private funding of parties argue that donations to parties are a form of political expression that should be protected in a democracy.[137] Public financing of political parties may decrease parties' pursuit of funds through corrupt methods, by decreasing their incentive to find alternate sources of funding.[138]



Campaign finance restrictions may be motivated by the perception that excessive or secretive contributions to political parties will make them beholden to people other than the voters.

One way of categorizing the sources of party funding is between public funding and private funding. Another dichotomy is between plutocratic and grassroots sources; parties which get much of their funding from large corporations may tend to pursue different policies and use different strategies than parties which are mostly funded through small donations by individual supporters.[139] Private funding for political parties can also be thought of as coming from internal or external sources: this distinguishes between dues from party members or contributions by candidates, and donations from entities outside of the party like non-members, corporations, or trade unions.[139] Internal funding may be preferred because external sources might make the party beholden to an outside entity.[139]

Uses for party funds

There are many ways for political parties to deploy money in order to secure better electoral outcomes. Parties often spend money to train activists, recruit volunteers, create and deploy advertisements, conduct research and support for their leadership in between elections, and promote their policy agenda.[133] Many political parties and candidates engage in a practice called clientelism, in which they distribute material rewards to people in exchange for political support; in many countries this is illegal, though even where it is illegal it may nevertheless be widespread in practice.[140] Some parties engage directly in vote-buying, in which a party gives money to a person in exchange for their vote.[141]

Though it may be crucial for a party to spend more than some threshold to win a given election, there are typically diminishing returns for expenses during a campaign.[142] Once a party has spent more than a certain amount, additional expenditures might not increase their chance of success.[143]

Restrictions

Fundraising and expenditures by political parties are regulated by governments, with regulations largely focusing on who can contribute money to parties, how parties' money can be spent, and how much of it can pass through the hands of a political party.[144] Two main ways that regulations affect parties is by intervening in their sources of income and by mandating that they maintain some level of transparency about their funding.[145] One common type of restriction on how parties acquire money is to limit who can donate money to political parties; for example, people who are not citizens of a country may not be allowed to make contributions to that country's political parties, in order to prevent foreign




interference.[144] It is also common to limit how much money an individual can give to a political party each election.[146] Similarly, many governments cap the total amount of money that can be spent by each party in an election.[135] Transparency regulations may require parties to disclose detailed financial information to the government, and in many countries transparency laws require those disclosures to be available to the public, as a safeguard against potential corruption.[133]



Creating, implementing, and amending laws regarding party expenses can be extremely difficult, since governments may be controlled by the very parties that these regulations restrict.[133]

Party colours and symbols

Nearly all political parties associate themselves with colours and symbols, primarily to aid voters in identifying, recognizing, and remembering the party. This branding is particularly important in polities where much of the population may be illiterate, so that someone who cannot read a party's name on a ballot can instead identify that party by colour or logo.[147] Parties of similar ideologies will often use the same colours across different countries.[148][149] Colour associations are useful as a short-hand for referring to and representing parties in graphical media.[150] They can also be used to refer to coalitions and alliances between political parties and other organizations;[151] examples include purple alliances, red-green alliances, traffic light coalitions, pan-green coalitions, and pan-blue coalitions.

However, associations between colour and ideology are extremely inconsistent: parties of the same ideology in different countries often use different colours, and sometimes competing parties in a country may even adopt the same colours.[152] These associations also have major exceptions. For example, in the United States, red is associated with the more conservative Republican Party while blue is associated with the more liberal Democratic Party, which is different from the typical mapping.[148][153]

Ideology	Colours	Symbols	Examples	References
Agrarianism	Green	Grain		[149]:58[154][155][156]
Anarchism	Black Red	Black flag, or black and red flag Letter *A* surrounded by a circle Black cat		[157][158][159][160]
Centrism	Purple			[161][162]
Communism	Red	Hammer and sickle Handshake		[163][164][165]
Conservatism	Blue			[166][167]
Democratic socialism	Red	Handshake Red rose Fist		[168][169]
Fascism	Black Brown	Fasces Swastika Runes		[149]:56[170][171]
Feminism	White Purple Gold Pink	Venus symbol Clenched fist Letter *F*		[172][173]
Green politics	Green	Sun Sunflower		[174][175]
Islamism	Green			[148][176]
Liberalism	Yellow			[150][177][178]
Libertarianism	Yellow	Porcupine		[148][179][180][181]

			Partido Libertários	
Monarchism	White Gold Purple	Crown		[149][182][183]
Pacifism	White	The white flag Dove Peace symbol White poppy V sign		[149][184]
Social democracy	Red	Handshake Red rose Fist		[185][186][187][168]
Socialism	Red	Red rose		[163][188][189][190][168]

See also

- List of largest political parties
- List of ruling political parties by country
- Lists of political parties by country

Further reading

- The Global Party Survey dataset (https://www.globalpartysurvey.org/)

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Nonpartisan blanket primary

A **nonpartisan blanket primary** is a primary election in which all candidates for the same elected office, regardless of respective political party, run against each other at once, instead of being segregated by political party. Multiple winners are selected and become the contestants in the general election, in a two-round system. In addition there is no separate party nomination process for candidates before the first round, and political parties are not allowed to whittle down the field using their own internal processes (such as party primaries or conventions). It is entirely possible that multiple candidates of the *same* political party advance to the general election.

In most cases there are two winners who advance to the general election, in which case it is also called a **top-two primary**. If more than two candidates are selected for the general election, it may be known as a **top-four primary** or **top-five primary**.[1] It is also known as a **jungle primary**.[2]

This system theoretically elects more moderate candidates, for winning might require appealing to voters of both parties in a two-party system.[3][4][5] However all primaries use plurality voting and are susceptible to vote splitting: the more candidates from the same party that run in the primary, the more likely that party is to lose.[5][3][6][7] Research on California's primaries has shown no increase in moderate candidates,[8] and no increase in turnout among nonpartisan voters.[9][4] Some have proposed using other voting systems in the primary to alleviate this problem, such as the Unified Primary based on approval voting.[5][10][11]

The top-two system is used for all primaries in Washington and California except presidential primaries, and Alaska will begin using a top-four primary system in 2022 with a general election using ranked-choice voting.

The so-called Louisiana primary is similar, with a first round to pick the top two of all the candidates, and a second round to choose between these top two. The differences are that the first election is the general election and the second is a later "runoff" election, and there is no second round if a candidate wins more than half the votes in the first round.

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Candidate party preference and ballot disclaimer

Because voters can vote in the first round for a candidate from any political party, the nonpartisan blanket primary has been compared to the original blanket primary, which was used in Washington for nearly 65 years[12] and briefly in California. The blanket primary was ruled unconstitutional in 2000 by the Supreme Court of the United States in *California Democratic Party v. Jones*, as it forced political parties to associate with candidates they did not endorse. The nonpartisan blanket primary disregards party preference in determining the candidates to advance to the general election and for that reason, it has been ruled *facially* constitutional by the Supreme Court in the 2008 decision *Washington State Grange v. Washington State Republican Party*.[13]

Chief Justice John Roberts concurred in the 2008 decision, stating: "If the ballot is designed in such a manner that no reasonable voter would believe that the candidates listed there are nominees or members of, or otherwise associated with, the parties the candidates claimed to 'prefer', the I–872 primary system would likely pass constitutional muster." Each candidate for partisan office can state a political party that he or she prefers. Ballots also must feature a disclaimer to voters that candidate's preference does not imply that the candidate is nominated or endorsed by the party or that the party approves of or associates with that candidate.

Subsequent *as applied challenges* were struck down by lower courts, and on October 1, 2012, the US Supreme Court refused to hear appeals from Washington Libertarian Party and Washington State Democratic Party. The Washington State Republican Party had earlier dropped out of the appeal process.

Use and examples

Both Washington and California implement a two-winner nonpartisan blanket primary by plurality vote.

The plan is used in Texas and some other states in special elections but not primaries. A notable example involved former US Senator Phil Gramm, who in 1983 (while a member of the House of Representatives), after switching from the Democratic to the Republican Party, resigned his seat as a Democrat on January 5, ran as a Republican for his own vacancy in a special election held on February 12, and won rather handily.

There have also been efforts in Oregon to pass a similar law, but the Oregon Senate rejected it in May 2007[1] and it failed in a November 2008 referendum as Measure 65. Oregon voters defeated it again in November 2014 as Measure 90, despite a $2.1 million donation from former New York City Mayor Michael Bloomberg and a $2.75 million donation from former Enron executive John D. Arnold to support it.[14]

Maryland has explored a top-tw primary, erroneously naming it a open primary, such as in 2019 House Bill 26.[15] Testimony was provided by several organizations, including FairVote and Common Cause, and independent constituents, and included statements about Condorcet systems, proportional representation and single transferable vote, and concerns that a top-two rather than top-three or more primary would not supply adequate choice for voters.[16]

Florida voters rejected an amendment to adopt the top-two primary in 2020.[17]

Alaska

In the 2020 Alaska elections, voters approved Measure 2, which will replace party primaries with a single nonpartisan blanket primary, in which the top 4 candidates will advance to a general election that uses ranked-choice voting. It will be used for all state and federal elections except for president.[18]

Washington state

Washington, along with California and Alaska, had a blanket primary system that allowed every voter to choose a candidate of any party for each position. That kind of system was ruled unconstitutional by the US Supreme Court in *California Democratic Party v. Jones* (2000) because it forced political parties to endorse candidates against their will.[13]

The Washington State Legislature passed a new primary system in 2004, which would have created a top-two nonpartisan blanket primary system. It provided an open primary as a backup, giving the governor the option to choose. Although Secretary of State Sam Reed advocated the blanket, non-partisan system, on April 1, 2004 the Governor used the line-item veto to activate the Open primary instead. In response, Washington's Initiative 872 was filed on January 8, 2004 by Terry Hunt from the Washington Grange, which proposed to create a nonpartisan blanket primary in that state. The measure passed with 59.8% of the vote (1,632,225 yes votes and 1,095,190 no votes) in 2004.[19] On March 18, 2008, the US Supreme Court ruled, in *Washington State Grange v. Washington State Republican Party*, that Washington's Initiative 872 was constitutionally permissible. Unlike the earlier blanket primary, it officially disregards party affiliation while allowing candidates to state their party preference. However, the court wanted to wait for more evidence before addressing the chief items in the complaint and remanded the decision to the lower courts.[13]

Starting in the 2008 election, Washington state implemented this Top 2 primary,[20] which applies to federal, state and local elections, but not to presidential elections.[21] There is no voter party registration in Washington, and candidates are not restricted to stating an affiliation with an established major or minor party. The candidate has up to 16 characters to describe on the ballot the party that he or she prefers.[22] Some candidates state a preference for an established major party, such as the Democratic Party or the Republican Party, while others use the ballot to send a message, such as Prefers No New Taxes Party or Prefers Salmon Yoga[23] Party. Since this is a "preference" and not a declaration of party membership, candidates can assert party affiliation without approval of the party itself, or use alternate terms for a given party. Gubernatorial candidate Dino Rossi's 2008 stated preference was for the "GOP Party", although he is a prominent Republican.[24]

Washington state legislature, 14th district, 2010

First Ballot, August 17, 2010[25]

Candidate	Party Preference	Support	Outcome
Norm Johnson	Republican	10,129 (44.26%)	Runoff
Michele Strobel	Republican	8,053 (35.19%)	Runoff
Scott Brumback	Democratic	4,702 (20.55%)	Defeated

Second Ballot November 2, 2010[26]

Candidate	Party Preference	Support	Outcome
Norm Johnson	Republican	19,044 (52.5%)	Elected
Michele Strobel	Republican	17,229 (47.5%)	Defeated

In this race a three-way primary led to a two-way race between two members of the same party (Republicans) in the general election. With over 20% of the population voting for the Democrat and neither Republican winning close to a majority in the primary, both of the Republican candidates had to appeal to Democrats and other voters who did not support them in the first round. For example, incumbent Norm Johnson came out in favor of same-sex civil unions, moving to the left of challenger Michele Strobel, who opposed them.[27]

Washington state legislature, 38th district, State Senate, 2010

First Ballot August 17, 2010[28]

Candidate	Party Preference	Support	Outcome
Nick Harper	Democratic	7,193 (35.09%)	Runoff
Rod Rieger	Conservative	6,713 (32.75%)	Runoff
Jean Berkey	Democratic	6,591 (32.16%)	Defeated

Second Ballot November 2, 2010[29]

Candidate	Party Preference	Support	Outcome
Nick Harper	Democratic	22,089 (59.73%)	Elected
Rod Rieger	Conservative	14,892 (40.27%)	Defeated

In this heavily Democratic district, Berkey was officially endorsed by the 38th District Democratic Party,[30] but Democratic challenger Nick Harper bankrolled ads for the Republican candidate in an effort to "Squeeze the Middle" and prevent the moderate incumbent Berkey from running in the general election.[31][32] When Berkey placed third in the primary by a margin of 122 votes, the Moxie Media scandal ensued: the state's election watchdog committee unanimously voted to refer the case to the state Attorney General Rob McKenna, who within hours "filed suit, alleging multiple campaign-finance violations".[31] Despite the call of several former state senators to hold another election, the election results were upheld and Berkey was prevented from running in the general election.[31][32] Harper easily won the subsequent uncompetitive runoff election.

Washington state US Senate race, 2010

First Ballot, August 17, 2010 (only top three vote-getters listed)[33]

Candidate	Party Preference	Support	Outcome
Patty Murray	Democratic	670,284 (46.22%)	Runoff
Dino Rossi	Republican	483,305 (33.33%)	Runoff
Clint Didier	Republican	185,034 (12.76%)	Defeated

Second Ballot November 2, 2010[26]

Candidate	Party Preference	Support	Outcome
Patty Murray	Democratic	1,314,930 (52.36%)	Elected
Dino Rossi	Republican	1,196,164 (47.64%)	Defeated

In this race, the three leading candidates' competition resulted in a more moderate and popular Republican facing off against the incumbent Democrat, with a relatively close general election. Clint Didier and Dino Rossi were the two main Republicans vying to run against the incumbent Democratic Senator Patty Murray. Rossi had much greater name recognition, had narrowly lost two races for governor, and was favored by the party establishment. Didier, a former tight end for the National Football League's Washington Redskins, had never run for elected office and was endorsed by Tea Party favorites Ron Paul and Sarah Palin. Didier might have been able to win the GOP nomination from Rossi in a closed primary that rewards candidates for appealing to the hardline of their base, but the more moderate Rossi was easily able to defeat Didier in the Top Two primary. While one might expect more Democrats in the Top Two primary to vote tactically for Didier, the Republican candidate who was doing much worse in polls against Murray, most Democrats seemed content voting for Murray. If any tactical voting occurred, it seemed to be on the Republican side, with the vast majority of the Republican voters choosing Rossi, perceived as a more electable candidate. In this case, the Top Two primary resulted in a more moderate Republican candidate running against the Democratic incumbent, and likely a much more competitive race than if the Tea Party candidate had run against Murray.[34]

Washington 4th Congressional District, 2014

The 4th district is a large and predominantly rural district in Central Washington that encompasses numerous counties and is dominated by the Tri-Cities and Yakima areas. Republican Doc Hastings, who represented the 4th district since 1995, retired.[35] The two winners of the top two primary were the Tea Party candidate Clint Didier (endorsed by Ron Paul) and Dan Newhouse, the former Director of the Washington State Department of Agriculture under Christine Gregoire and former State Representative.[36][37] In a close general election, Newhouse prevailed.

Top two primary results[38]

Party	Candidate	Votes	%
Republican	**Clint Didier**	**33,965**	**31.81**
Republican	**Dan Newhouse**	**27,326**	**25.59**
Democratic	Estakio Beltran	13,062	12.23
Republican	Janéa Holmquist Newbry	11,061	10.36
Republican	George Cicotte	6,863	6.43
Democratic	Tony Sandoval	6,744	6.32
Independent	Richard Wright	3,270	3.06
Republican	Gavin Seim	2,107	1.97
Independent	Josh Ramirez	1,496	1.40
Republican	Glen R. Stockwell	547	0.51
Republican	Gordon Allen Pross	178	0.17
Republican	Kevin Midbust	161	0.15
	Total votes	**106,780**	**100.0**

General Election - November 4, 2014 [39]

Party	Candidate	Votes	%
Republican	**Dan Newhouse**	**77,772**	**50.81**
Republican	Clint Didier	75,307	49.19
	Total votes	**153,079**	**100.0**
Republican **hold**			

California

California's blanket primary system was ruled unconstitutional in *California Democratic Party v. Jones* in 2000 because it forced political parties to associate with candidates they did not endorse. Then in 2004, Proposition 62, an initiative to bring the nonpartisan blanket primary to California, failed with only 46% of the vote. However, Proposition 14, a nearly identical piece of legislation, passed on the June 2010 ballot with 53.7% of the vote.[40]

Under Proposition 14, statewide and congressional candidates in California, regardless of party preference, participate in the nonpartisan blanket primary. However, a candidate must prefer the major party on the ballot that they are registered in. After the June primary election, the top two candidates advance to the November general election. That does not affect the presidential primary, local offices, or non-partisan offices such as judges and the Superintendent of Public Instruction.[41] The California Secretary of State now calls the system a "Top-Two Primary".[42]

Federal elections

The 2012 general election was the first non-special election in California to use the nonpartisan blanket primary system established by Proposition 14. As a result, eight congressional districts featured general elections with two candidates of the same party: the 15th, 30th, 35th, 40th, 43rd, and 44th with two Democrats, and the 8th and 31st with two Republicans.

In the 2014 general election, eight congressional districts featured general elections with two candidates of the same party: the 17th, 19th, 34th, 35th, 40th, and 44th with two Democrats, and the 4th and 25th with two Republicans.

In the 2016 general election, the U.S. Senate race featured two Democrats running against each other, and seven congressional districts with two Democrats running against each other: the 17th, 29th, 32nd, 34th, 37th, 44th, and 46th. There were no races with two Republicans running against each other.

California 15th Congressional District, 2012

The 15th district is based in the East Bay and includes Hayward and Livermore. Democrat Pete Stark, who represented the 13th district from 1993 to 2013 and its predecessors since 1973, lost reelection here to fellow Democrat Eric Swalwell in the general election after Stark won the primary.

California's 15th congressional district election, 2012

Party	Candidate	Votes	%
Primary election			
Democratic	Pete Stark (incumbent)	39,943	42.1
Democratic	Eric Swalwell	34,347	36.0
No party preference	Christopher "Chris" J. Pareja	20,618	21.7
	Total votes	**94,908**	**100.0**
General election			
Democratic	**Eric Swalwell**	**120,388**	**52.1**
Democratic	Pete Stark (incumbent)	110,646	47.9
	Total votes	**231,034**	**100.0**
Democratic **hold**			

Analysis

Though the intention is to allow multiple candidates from the majority party to advance to the second round (including, hopefully, one more representative of the broader population), critics note that this can also happen to a minority party when that party runs fewer candidates than another and thus faces less vote-splitting. Under the nonpartisan blanket primary, a party with two candidates and only 41% popular support would beat a party with three candidates and 59% popular support if voters split their votes evenly among candidates for their own party. For example, in Washington's 2016 primary for state treasurer, Democrats won a majority of the vote but failed to move on to the general election:[43]

Candidate	Party Preference	Support	Outcome
Duane Davidson	Republican	322,374 (25.09%)	Runoff
Michael Waite	Republican	299,766 (23.33%)	Runoff
Marko Liias	Democratic	261,633 (20.36%)	Defeated
John Paul Comerford	Democratic	230,904 (17.97%)	Defeated
Alec Fisken	Democratic	170,117 (13.24%)	Defeated

Political Science Professor Todd Donovan published an article in 2012 for the *California Journal of Politics & Policy* called "The Top Two Primary: What Can California Learn from Washington?"[44][45] Donovan was the only expert witness in favor of the top-two idea,[46] for the *as applied* court challenge of Top-Two. His academic paper states, "The partisan structure of Washington's legislature appears unaltered by the new primary system." Donovan concluded, "The aggregate of all this did not add up to a legislature that looked different or functioned differently from the legislature elected under a partisan primary."

In Washington, major parties originally used an alternate process of party endorsement for partisan legislative and county administrative positions.[47] This would ensure that one official party candidate will be in the primary, theoretically reducing the risk of intra-party vote splits. However, the law does not allow nominations or endorsements by interest groups, political action committees, political parties, labor unions, editorial boards, or other private organizations to be printed on the ballot.[48]

The indication of party *preference* as opposed to party *affiliation* opens the door for candidates to misrepresent their leanings or otherwise confuse voters. In 2008, a Washington gubernatorial candidate indicated party preference as "G.O.P." instead of Republican. A public poll found that 25% of the public did not know that the two terms mean the same thing.[49]

Further research on California's 2012 jungle primaries suggests that a jungle primary does not tend to lead to large amounts of crossover votes.[50] Most voters who crossed over did so for strategic reasons. Furthermore, there is evidence that having the top two candidates from the same party could lead to a drop in voter participation in the second round.

With regards to reducing political polarization, this does not seem to hold true. Due to lack of crossover votes, an extreme candidate from the majority party can still win over a moderate from the other party.[51][52][53][54] Though the intention of the system is to get a moderate from the majority party, this will not happen if there is no moderate, if the moderate lacks name recognition, or if voters are unsure of which candidate is more moderate.

See also

- Instant-runoff voting
- Two-round system
- Two-party-preferred vote

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Notes

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4. ^ Myths vs. Facts: Proposition 62 (https://web.archive.org/web/20110718141201/http://www.yeson60.com/myths_vs__facts__proposition_62.html)

External links

- Land of a Thousand Liebermans (https://web.archive.org/web/20140207043720/http://www.fivethirtyeight.com/2009/02/land-of-thousand-liebermans.html) analysis by Nate Silver of *FiveThirtyEight.com*
- Will California's 'Top Two' Primary Work? (https://web.archive.org/web/20150329203844/http://roomfordebate.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/06/09/will-californias-top-two-primary-work/) *The New York Times* provides six views on new California primary
- Washington's top-two primary gets voters the better choice (https://web.archive.org/web/20100924022320/http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/editorials/2012672963_edit20toptwo.html) *The Seattle Times* editorial praising Top Two primary in Washington state 2010 elections
- Top Two primary worth considering (https://web.archive.org/web/20120823064526/http://azdailysun.com/news/opinion/mailbag/top-two-primary-worth-considering/article_615362ce-1f63-5292-98d1-a549b7a76049.html) advocating Top Two primary for Arizona
- Pros and cons of a top-two primary (https://web.archive.org/web/20160306023415/http://articles.latimes.com/2009/feb/20/opinion/oe-hill20) The *Los Angeles Times* presents two views on the Top Two primary
- Stop Top Two (https://web.archive.org/web/20110826193743/http://www.stoptoptwo.org/) Free and Equal Elections Foundation, a coalition of independent and minority party activists opposing the Top Two primary
- *Washington State Grange v. Washington State Republican Party* (https://web.archive.org/web/20150906172512/https://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/06-713.ZS.html) upholding top-two primary

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Ballot Measure No. 2

An Act Replacing the Political Party Primary with an Open Primary System and Ranked-Choice General Election, and Requiring Additional Campaign Finance Disclosures

Ballot Language

Ballot Measure No. 2 – 19AKBE
An Act Replacing the Political Party Primary with an Open Primary System and Ranked-Choice General Election, and Requiring Additional Campaign Finance Disclosures

This act would get rid of the party primary system, and political parties would no longer select their candidates to appear on the general election ballot. Instead, this act would create an open nonpartisan primary where all candidates would appear on one ballot. Candidates could choose to have a political party preference listed next to their name or be listed as "undeclared" or "nonpartisan." The four candidates with the most votes in the primary election would have their names placed on the general election ballot.

This act would establish ranked-choice voting for the general election. Voters would have the option to "rank" candidates in order of choice. Voters would rank their first choice candidate as "1", second choice candidate as "2", and so on. Voters "1" choice would be counted first. If no candidate received a majority after counting the first-ranked votes, then the candidate with the least amount of "1" votes would be removed from counting. Those ballots that ranked the removed candidate as "1" would then be counted for the voters' "2" ranked candidate. This process would repeat until one candidate received a majority of the remaining votes. If voters still want to choose only one candidate, they can.

This act would also require additional disclosures for contributions to independent expenditure groups and relating to the sources of contributions. It would also require a disclaimer on paid election communications by independent expenditure groups funded by a majority of out of state money.

Should this initiative become law?

◯ Yes ◯ No

Section 9: Rural and Unorganized Political Organizations

The SCC is encouraged to adopt interim rules that assist rural or unorganized district organizations. In the absence of interim rules adopted by the SCC, the ARP Chairman, or the SEC, is given discretion to facilitate the organization of rural and unorganized districts. However, at any time, any district committee in such a district may schedule a meeting and a vote to declare itself organized and then be subject to all the rights, responsibilities and procedures of any organized District.

Section 10: Primary Elections

(a) Eligible Voters

Only registered Republicans, registered Independents, and those who state no preference of party affiliation shall be allowed to vote in the Republican Primary Election for Governor, Lieutenant Governor, US Senator, US Representative, and members of the State Legislature.

(b) Republican Designation

No person may use the word Republican on any ballot or in any campaign as part of a description of himself as a candidate unless that person is an ARP candidate, selected according to ARP Rules.

(c) Maximize Voter Participation in Primary Elections

(1) Any voter qualified to vote in the Republican Party primary may vote in that election, regardless of whether or not that voter has voted in the primary election of any other party.

(2) The fact that a voter has voted in the Republican Party primary election shall not disqualify that voter from voting in the primary election of any other political party or parties, where that voter's participation in the primary election of other parties is authorized or permitted by the rules of the other party or parties, or the statutes of the United States or the State of Alaska.

(d) Modification to Primary System

The SCC, or the SEC in the event that there is insufficient time to convene the SCC, may adopt any and all additional rules, regulations, interpretations, clarifications, and the like, which are necessary or desirable to implement the Republican primary election in accord with other rules adopted at this Special Convention, and pursuant to Art XIII. Any action taken by the Central or Executive Committee under the provisions of this rule shall have the same force and effect as if adopted by this convention.

ARTICLE II - AMENDMENT, INTERPRETATION, ENFORCEMENT, AND PUBLICATION, OF RULES AND PLATFORM CHANGES

Section1: How Rules May Be Amended

(a) These rules may be amended at any regular ARP state convention or at any special ARP state convention by a majority of the delegates duly voting at a properly called convention. All recommended rules changes made by the district conventions shall be forwarded to the State Rules Committee fifteen (15) or more calendar days before the date of the state convention. Any

Ranked voting

Ranked voting, also known as **ranked-choice voting** or **preferential voting**, is any election voting system in which voters use a ranked (or preferential) ballot to select more than one candidate (or other alternative being voted on) and to rank these choices in a sequence on the ordinal scale of 1st, 2nd, 3rd, etc. There are multiple ways in which the rankings can be counted to determine which candidate or candidates (or other outcome(s)) is or are elected (or adopted), and these different methods may produce different results from the same set of ballots. Ranked voting is different from cardinal voting, where candidates are independently rated, rather than ranked.[1]

The term "ranked-choice voting" (RCV) is used by the US organization FairVote to refer to the use of ranked ballots with specific counting methods: either instant-runoff voting for single-winner elections or single transferable vote for multi-winner elections. In some locations, the term "preferential voting" is used to refer to this combination of ballot type and counting method, while in other locations this term has various more-specialized meanings.[2]

Single Transferable Voting (STV) is categorized specifically as a voting system to resemble proportional representation through multiple constituencies rather than one. Since both STV and RCV hold similar processes, they are commonly used interchangeably. Those advocating for STV argue that since candidates of different parties can be written on the ballot, rather than from just one, all members of government can be elected based upon their individual merits.[3] Voters also have the option to create connections with local candidates under STV, where constituencies can cover a smaller area, creating a local link, giving voters a choice of representatives to contact.[4]

A ranked voting system collects more information from voters than the single-mark ballots currently used in most governmental elections, many of which use first-past-the-post and mixed-member proportional voting systems.

There are many types of ranked voting, with several used in governmental elections. Instant-runoff voting is used in Australian state and federal elections, in Ireland for its presidential elections, and by some jurisdictions in the United States, United Kingdom, and New Zealand. A type and classification of ranked voting is called the single transferable vote, which is used for national elections in Ireland and Malta, the Australian Senate, for regional and local elections in Northern Ireland, for all local elections in Scotland, and for some local elections in New Zealand and the United States. Borda count is used in Slovenia[5] and Nauru. Contingent vote and Supplementary vote are also used in a few locations. Condorcet methods are used by private organizations and minor parties, but currently are not used in governmental elections.

Arrow's impossibility theorem and Gibbard's theorem prove that all voting systems must make trade-offs between desirable properties, such as the preference between two candidates being unaffected by the popularity of a third candidate.[6][7] Accordingly there is no consensus among academics or public servants as to the "best" electoral system.[8]

Recently, an increasing number of authors, including David Farrell, Ian McAllister and Jurij Toplak, see preferentiality as one of the characteristics by which electoral systems can be evaluated.[2][9] According to this view, all electoral methods are preferential, but to different degrees and may even be classified according to their preferentiality.[2] By this logic, cardinal voting methods such as Score voting or STAR voting are also "preferential".

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Types

There are different preferential voting systems, so it is sometimes difficult to distinguish between them.

Selection of the Condorcet winner is generally considered by psephologists as the ideal election outcome for a ranked system,[10] so "Condorcet efficiency" is important when evaluating different methods of preferential voting.[11] The Condorcet winner is the one that would win every two-way contest against every other alternative.[6]


Another criterion used to gauge the effectiveness of a preferential voting system is its ability to withstand manipulative voting strategies, when voters cast ballots that do not reflect their preferences in the hope of electing their first choice. This can be rated on at least two dimensions—the number of voters needed to game the system, and the sophistication of the strategy necessary.[11]

Instant-runoff voting

This system simulates a series of runoff elections. Voters may rank all candidates as their 1st choice, 2nd choice, 3rd choice, and so on rather than indicating support for only one candidate.[12] A candidate with the majority (more than 50%) of first choice votes (the number one spot on the ballot) wins the election outright.[13] If no candidate is the first choice of more than half of the voters, then all votes cast for the candidate with the fewest first choices are redistributed to the remaining candidates based on who is ranked next on each ballot. If this does not result in any candidate receiving a majority, further rounds of redistribution occur.[14][13]

This method is thought to be resistant to manipulative voting as the only strategies that work against it require voters to highly rank choices they actually want to see lose. At the same time, this system fails Condorcet criterion, meaning a candidate can win even if the voters preferred a different candidate, and fails the monotonicity criterion, where ranking a candidate higher can lessen the chances he or she will be elected and vice versa. Additionally, instant-runoff voting has a lower Condorcet efficiency than similar systems when there are more than four choices.[11]

Rank ballot by oval marks



Sample ballot of ranked voting using column marks

Contingent Vote


With the contingent vote, all candidates other than the two receiving the most first-choice votes are eliminated at once, and choices are reallocated to one of those two.

Single transferable vote

This method is used for electing multi-member constituencies. Any candidates that achieve the number of votes required for election (the quota) are elected and their surplus votes above the quota are redistributed to voters' next choice candidate(s). Once this is done, if not all seats have been filled then the candidate with the lowest number of votes is eliminated, and their votes are also redistributed to the voter's next choice. This whole process is repeated until all seats are filled. This method is also called the Hare-Clark system, and its outcome should be proportional to the electorate.[15] Voters can also vote for members of different political parties on the same ballot, rather than of just one party.[16]

When single transferable vote is used for single-winner elections, it becomes equivalent to instant-runoff voting.[17] Both methods may be known as ranked-choice voting in the US.

Rank ballot by written names



Sample ballot of ranked voting using written names

Condorcet method

Positional voting

Positional voting is a ranked voting electoral system in which the options receive points based on their rank position on each ballot and the option with the most points overall wins.[18] Plurality, anti-plurality, and Borda count are the three different methods in a positional voting. A candidate will receive a certain number of points based on the voter's ranking.[19]

Borda count

Borda is a positional system in which ballots are counted by assigning a point value to each place in each voter's ranking of the candidates, and the choice with the largest number of points overall is elected. This method is named after its inventor, French mathematician Jean-Charles de Borda.[6] Instead of selecting a Condorcet winner, this system may select a choice that reflects an average of the preferences of the constituency.

The Borda count does not exhibit independence of irrelevant alternatives[6] or independence of clones meaning the outcome it selects is dependent on the other choices present. In large scale elections, the Borda Count is only weakly manipulated by adding candidates, called clones, whose views are similar to the preferred candidate's, but in a small committee election it can more easily manipulated. An example of this strategy can be seen in Kiribati's 1991 presidential nomination contest.[20]

Path Voting (Schulze Method)

Examples

Some examples of RCV elections are shown below. The first table shows the process of RCV and the second demonstrates how Instant Runoff Voting plays a role in these elections. These examples have been taken from Ballotpedia (https://ballotpedia.org/Ranked-choice_voting_(RCV)) and represents hypothetical situations to demonstrate a process and clarify a concept.[21]

Example 1

Raw first-preference vote in political race

Candidate	First-Preference Votes	Percent outcome
Candidate A	475	46.34%
Candidate B	300	29.27%
Candidate C	175	17.07%
Candidate D	75	7.32%

Hypothetically speaking, there are four candidates running for a political election, the figure above shows the first preference votes based on each candidate and the accompanied percentages of total votes.

According to the results of the first election, no candidate received an outright majority, with the largest being candidate A with 46.34%. Based on Instant Runoff Election strategy, the candidate with the lowest total votes is to be eliminated, so in this case, candidate D is eliminated. As follows, the first-preference votes for the eliminated candidate are given to voter back-ups. For the sake of the example, assume that of the total 75 votes Candidate D received, Candidate A was listed as their second choice by 50 voters, and Candidate B was listed as a second preference by 25 of the voters.[22]

Example 2

The second example will demonstrate how the concept of Instant Runoff is used to achieve a winner in a RCV system in the case that a majority is not initially secured.

Adjusted Vote in a political race

Candidate	Adjusted first-preference votes	Percentage
Candidate A	525	51.22%
Candidate B	325	31.71%
Candidate C	175	17.07%

According to the figure in example two, Candidate A received 51.22% of the votes among the second tally, therefore, winning the election. The process of Instant runoff as demonstrated above would hypothetically continue until a Candidate receives a majority of the voter population, regardless of the number of recounts it would take.

Pros and Cons of RCV

Pros

Advocates of ranked choice voting (instant run-off and single transferable vote) argue that RCV promotes majority support: the voting process continues until the winner is selected using a majority of votes, thus gaining support and favor over a greater majority of people.[23] Subsequently, RCV provides more choice for voters over candidates they choose, potentially, minimizing tactical voting whereby a voter would support another candidate more strongly than their honest preference, for the purpose to prevent an undesirable outcome.[24] Candidates that run a negative campaign strategy may see a decline in support as first or second choices. Compared to running primary elections, in order to decrease the number of candidates running for a particular position, a ranked choice voting system may cost less to run due to the requirement of only one election, rather than multiple primaries or run-off elections to narrow down the field.[25]

Cons

Critics of a ranked choice voting system argue that the concept is new and a subset of voters dislike change, possibly causing them to dislike the system and not participate. Among other arguments is the fear that the ballots and counting processes will be more expensive and prone to user error. Counting RCV ballots by hand is more complex but can be done quickly with a computerized counting system. While utilizing a computerized counting system, critics of ranked voting argue it is still necessary to hold on to the paper ballots so that election recounts can still be performed, minimizing error and holding a greater validity of results.[26] Concurrently, new, diverse voices will emerge by providing candidates a starting ground for those with a lack of name recognition. Critics add that previously, it would be difficult for women and people of color to share their voice because of this lack of name recognition that their challengers may have, providing a more equal and fair competition ground for all.[27] Some critics find that a single-election implementation of ranked voting makes it harder to vet and critique candidates without a primary election that winnows the candidate field.

Uniqueness of votes

If there are a large number of candidates, which is quite common in single transferable vote elections, then it is likely that many preference voting patterns will be unique to individual voters.[28][29] For example, in the 2002 Irish general election, the electronic votes were published for the Dublin North constituency.[30] There were 12 candidates and almost 44,000 votes cast. The most common pattern (for the three candidates from one party in a particular order) was chosen by only 800 voters, and more than 16,000 patterns were chosen by just one voter each.

The number of possible complete rankings with no ties is the factorial of the number of candidates, N; but if ties are allowed freely, it is equal to the corresponding ordered Bell number and is asymptotic to

$$\frac{N!}{2(\ln 2)^{N+1}}$$ [31]

In the case common to instant-runoff voting in which no ties are allowed, except for unranked candidates who are tied for last place on a ballot, the number of possible rankings for N candidates is precisely

$$\sum_{n=1}^{N-1} \frac{N!}{n!} = \lfloor (e-1)N! - 1 \rfloor = \text{floor}\left((e-1)N! - 1\right)$$ [32]

Use by politics

Countries and regions

Country	Years in use	Type	Notes
Australia	1918–present[33][34]	Single transferable vote, instant-runoff voting	From 1949, the single transferable vote method has been used for upper house legislative elections.[35] Instant-runoff voting is used for lower house elections.[36]
Canada		Instant-runoff voting	Used in whole or in part to elect the leaders of the three largest federal political parties in Canada: the Liberal Party of Canada,[37] the Conservative Party of Canada, and the New Democratic Party, albeit the New Democratic Party uses a mixture of IRV and exhaustive voting, allowing each member to choose one format or the other for their vote.
Estonia	1990–c. 2001	Single transferable vote	As of 2001, single transferable vote had been in use since 1990 to decide legislative elections.[35] This is no longer the case.[38]
Fiji	1998–present	Instant-runoff voting	[39]
Hong Kong	1998–present[40]	Instant-runoff voting[41]	Instant-runoff voting is only used in the 4 smallest of Hong Kong's 29 functional constituencies.[42] Officially called preferential elimination voting, the system is identical to the instant-runoff voting.[41]
Ireland	1922–present	Single transferable vote[43]	Single transferable vote is prescribed by Constitution or statute for all public elections.[43] In single-winner cases (presidential, most Dáil by-elections) this reduces to instant-runoff voting. Referendums to abolish STV for Dáil elections failed in 1958 and 1968.[43]
Malta	1921–present	Single transferable vote	[35]
Nauru	1968–present[35]	Borda count	Nauru uses the Dowdall system, a variant of the Borda count that behaves more like FPTP.[44][45]
New Zealand	2004–present[46]	Single transferable vote[47]	Instant-runoff voting is used in only some single-seat elections, such as district health boards as well as some city and district councils.[47]
Northern Ireland	1973–present[35]	Single transferable vote[48]	Used for local government, European Parliament and the regional legislature, but not elections to Westminster.
Papua New Guinea	2007–present[49]	Instant-runoff voting[11]	Between 1964 and 1975, Papua New Guinea used a system that allowed voters the option of ranking candidates.[35] Currently, voters can rank only their top three choices.[50]
Slovenia	2000–present[51]	Borda count	Only two seats, which are reserved for Hungarian and Italian minorities, are decided using a Borda count.[52]
Sri Lanka	1978–present	Contingent vote and open list	Contingent vote is used for presidential elections,[35] and open list for legislative elections.[53]
United States	2020	Limited instant-runoff voting	In their 2020 primaries, several states used a form of instant run-off in Democratic Party primaries.

Country	Years in use	Type	Notes
Zimbabwe[54]	1979–1985	Instant-runoff voting	Was only used for white candidates

Federal provinces or states

Province/state	Country	Years in use	Type	Notes
Alaska[55]	United States	2022	Instant-runoff voting	Approved by Alaska voters in 2020 via ballot measure.
Alberta[35]	Canada	1952–1954	Instant-runoff voting	
Australian Capital Territory[35]	Australia	1993–present	Single transferable vote	
British Columbia[35]	Canada	1926–1955	Instant-runoff voting	
Maine[56]	United States	2018–present	Instant-runoff voting	Originally approved by Maine voters as a 2016 ballot referendum to replace the First Past The Post system statewide, a 2017 state law sought to delay implementation of ranked-choice voting until 2021, to allow time for amending the state constitution. Supporters overrode the delay with a 2018 people's veto referendum that received a majority of votes, ensuring that ranked-choice voting would be used for future primary and federal elections.
Manitoba[35]	Canada	1927–1936	Instant-runoff voting	
New South Wales[35]	Australia	1918–present	Single transferable vote (1918–1926, 1978–present), contingent vote (1926–1928), instant-runoff voting (1929–present)	Since 1978, NSW has used the single transferable vote method to decide upper house legislative elections only. Full preferential voting for lower house since 1981.
North Carolina[57]	United States	2006–2013	Instant-runoff voting	A state law in 2006 established instant-runoff voting for certain judicial elections, until a 2013 law repealed the practice.
Northern Territory[35]	Australia	1980 only		

Province/state	Country	Years in use	Type	Notes
Ontario	Canada	2018–present	Instant-runoff voting (municipal elections only)	In 2016, the provincial government passed Bill 181, the Municipal Elections Modernization Act, which permitted municipalities to adopt ranked balloting in municipal elections.[58] In the 2018 elections, the first ones conducted under the new legislation, the city of London used ranked balloting,[59] while the cities of Kingston and Cambridge held referendums on whether to adopt ranked ballots for the next municipal elections in 2022.[60]
Queensland[35]	Australia	1892–1942, 1962–present	Contingent vote (1892–1942), instant-runoff voting (1962–present)	Full preferential voting used 1962–1992 and since 2016.
South Australia[35]	Australia	1929–present, 1982–present	Instant-runoff voting (1929–present), single transferable vote (1982–present)	Instant runoff for the lower house, single transferable for the upper house.
Tasmania[35]	Australia	1907–present	Single transferable vote (1907–present), instant-runoff voting (1909–present)	Single transferable for the lower house, instant runoff for the upper house.
Victoria[35]	Australia	1911–present	Instant-runoff voting (1911–present), single transferable vote (2006–present)	Prior to 1916, Victoria did not use any preferential voting method to decide upper house legislative elections. Instant runoff for the lower house, single transferable for the upper house. Full preferential voting for lower house since 1916.
Western Australia[35]	Australia	1907–present	Instant-runoff voting (1907–present), single transferable vote (1989–present)	Instant runoff for the lower house, single transferable for the upper house. Full preferential voting for lower house since 1912.

Municipalities

City/town	Years in use	Type	Notes
Ann Arbor, MI[61]	1975 only	Instant-runoff voting	
Aspen, CO[62]	2009 only	Instant-runoff voting	
Berkeley, CA[63]	2010–present	Instant-runoff voting	
Burlington, VT[64][65][66]	2005–2010; 2021–present	Instant-runoff voting	Repealed for mayoral elections after the 2009 election; in 2021 a referendum reinstated it for the city council elections.
Cambridge, MA[67]	1941–present	Single transferable vote	
Hendersonville, NC[68]	2007–2013	Instant-runoff voting	part of a statewide pilot program,[69] deauthorized in 2013[70]
London	2000–present[71]	Supplementary vote[72]	
London, Ontario[73]	2018 – present	Instant-runoff voting	
Memphis, TN[14]	2011–present	Instant-runoff voting	
Minneapolis, MN[74]	2009–present	Instant-runoff voting	
New York City, NY[75][76]	2021–present	Instant-runoff voting	Only applies to primaries and special elections for municipal offices
Oakland, CA[63]	2010–present	Instant-runoff voting	
Portland, ME[14]	2011–present	Instant-runoff voting	
San Francisco, CA	2004–present[77]	Instant-runoff voting[14]	
San Leandro, CA[63]	2010–present	Instant-runoff voting	
Santa Fe, NM	2018–present	Instant-runoff voting	
St. Paul, MN	2011–present[78]	Instant-runoff voting[79]	
Takoma Park, MD[80]	2006–present	Instant-runoff voting	
Telluride, CO[81]	2011–present	Instant-runoff voting	

International organizations

Organization	Years in use	Type	Notes
European Union[82]		option to use single transferable vote	Member countries can use either party-list proportional representation (not a type of preferential voting) or single transferable vote to elect MEPs

Use outside of politics

The winner of the Eurovision Song Contest is selected by a positional voting system. The most recent system was implemented in the 2016 contest, and sees each participating country award two sets of 12, 10, 8–1 points to their 10 favourite songs: one set from their professional jury and the other from tele-voting.[83]

See also

- Comparison of electoral systems
- Donkey vote
- FairVote
- Implicit utilitarian voting
- weighted voting

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B

Alaska Automatic Runoff Voting Initiative, Measure 1 (August 2002)

The **Alaska Automatic Runoff Voting Initiative**, also known as **Measure 1**, was on the August 27, 2002 ballot in Alaska as an indirect initiated state statute, where it was **defeated.** The measure would have established a preferential voting system, also known as automatic runoff or ranked-choice voting.[1]

Voting on elections and campaigns




Ballot measures

By state

By year

Not on ballot

Local [show]



Laws • History

List of measures

Election results

Alaska Measure 1 (August 2002)

Result	Votes	Percentage
No	**69,683**	**63.73%**
Yes	39,666	36.27%

Election results via: Alaska Department of Elections

Text of measure

The language appeared on the ballot as:[1]

EXHIBIT J PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

"

BALLOT MEASURE NO. 1
99 PRVT
INITIATIVE IMPLEMENTING ALTERNATIVE VOTING ELECTORAL SYSTEM

This bill enacts preferential voting for state and federal elections, except governor. Voters would rank one to five candidate choices per office. A candidate who receives a majority of first choice votes would be elected. If no candidate gets a majority vote, the candidate with fewest first choice votes is defeated. Then, remaining candidates receive the next choice votes of voters whose first choice candidate was defeated. This process continues until one candidate gets a majority of the combined votes. In a primary election, a voter may only rank candidates within one party.

Shall this initiative become law?

YES
NO[2]

"

See also

- List of Alaska ballot measures
- Alaska 2002 ballot measures
- 2002 ballot measures

Suggest a link

External links

- Alaska 2002 Election Results
- 2002 Alaska Voter Guide

Footnotes

1. *Alaska Department of Elections*, "2002 Official Election Pamphlet: Ballot Measures," accessed February 9, 2015
2. *Note: This text is quoted verbatim from the original source. Any inconsistencies are attributable to the original source.*


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http://www.newsminer.com/news/local_news/borough-leaders-vote-down-ranked-choice-voting/article_6eea23ee-aa11-11eb-9cd1-87dabc388b38.html

FEATURED

Borough leaders vote down ranked choice voting

Amanda Bohman, abohman@newsminer.com
Apr 30, 2021



Poll workers at the Fairbanks North Star Borough Juanita Helms Administrative Center that voting had been slow throughout the day, attributing the low turnout numbers to increased use of voting by mail this year due to concerns over COVID-19. Erin McGroarty/News-Miner.

The assembly finished off ranked choice voting in a 1-7 vote on Thursday.

The sponsors even abandoned the idea after protests and dozens of emails and comments in opposition.

HOUSE BILL NO. 174

IN THE LEGISLATURE OF THE STATE OF ALASKA

THIRTY-SECOND LEGISLATURE - FIRST SESSION

BY REPRESENTATIVES MERRICK, Rasmussen, LeBon, Cronk, Patkotak

Introduced: 4/14/21
Referred: Judiciary, State Affairs

A BILL

FOR AN ACT ENTITLED

"An Act relating to proposing and enacting laws by initiative."

BE IT ENACTED BY THE LEGISLATURE OF THE STATE OF ALASKA:

*** Section 1.** AS 15.45.240 is amended by adding a new subsection to read:

(b) The provisions of an initiative are not severable after being circulated under AS 15.45.110. An initiative petition may not contain a severability clause. If a court finds a provision of an initiative petition unconstitutional during a review under (a) of this section, the court shall order the lieutenant governor to reject the entire initiative petition and prohibit the placement of the initiative on the ballot.