		1
1	IN THE SUPERIOR COURT FOR THE STATE OF ALASKA	
2	FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT	
3		
4	ERIC LANSER,	
5	Plaintiff,	
6	vs.	
7	ROBERT RIDDLE,	
8	Defendant.	
9	Case No. 4FA-11-03117 CI Supreme Court No. S-15780	
10		
11	VOLUME I	
12	TRANSCRIPT OF TRIAL PROCEEDINGS	
13	July 9, 2013 - Pages 1 through 267	
14		
15		
16		
17		
18		
19		
20		
21 22		
22		
23 24		
24 25		
43		

			9
1			
2			
3			
4			
5			
6			
7		TRANSCRIPT O	F TRIAL PROCEEDINGS
8	BEFORE THE HONORABLE BETHANY S. HARBISON		
9		Superi	or Court Judge
10			Fairbanks, Alaska July 9, 2013
11			8:33 A.M.
12	APPEARAN	ICES:	
13	FOR THE	PLAINTIFF:	AIMEE ANDERSON ORAVEC Oravec Law Group, LLC
14			415 1st Avenue, Suite A Fairbanks, Alaska 99701
15	FOR THE	DEFENDANT:	WILLIAM R. SATTERBERG, JR.
16 17			WENDY M. DOXEY Satterberg Law Offices 709 4th Avenue
18			Fairbanks, Alaska 99701
19	i		
20			
21			
22			
23			
24			

			6
1	TABLE OF CONTENTS, CONTINUED		
2	EXHIBITS:	ADMITTED	ļ
3	FOR THE DEFENDANT:		
4	DT - Photograph - Lime Application to Pond	720	
5	A - Solid Waste Disposal Permit	1125	
6	K - FNSB Department of Community Planning Letter	1125	
7	FN - Photo of Plaintiff's Chicken Coop	1206	
8	FO - Google Earth Photo Projection	1298	
9	FQ - MacInnis Photos from April	1351	
10	FR - MacInnis Photos from September	1351	
11	BM - Farm Conservation Plan	1474	
12	BN - Farm Conservation Plan	1474	
13	BO - Farm Conservation Plan	1474	
14	BP - Farm Conservation Plan	1474	
15	BQ - Farm Conservation Plan	1474	
16	BR - Farm Conservation Plan	1474	
17	CG - Transaction by Detailed Account	1866	
18	CS - Invoice	1870	
19	CQ - Invoice	1870	
20	CP - Invoice	1870	
21	AN - DEC Letter to Mr. Riddle 9/5/12	2000	
22	B - Application to DEC for Land Application Permit	2000	
23	DJ - Photograph of Disking Process	2037	
24 25	DP - Photograph of Snow-covered Cut Oats	2038	

EJ - Photograph of Oats Field
Crystal D. Thompson
Court Reporter
104 Kutter Road

2039

1 PROCEEDINGS 2 [CourtSmart] 08:33:15 A.M. 3 (On record.) 4 5 THE CLERK: On record. 6 THE COURT: We're on record in Lanser versus Riddle; 7 4FA-11-3117. The parties are here with counsel. And this 8 is the time set for trial. 9 We were going to take up a few things in the 10 first half hour and then start with witnesses at 9:00. 11 I've received the motions for reconsideration. 12 I learned another lesson about being more specific. 13 rolled in, I guess, around 10:30 or 11:00 yesterday from 14 each side. And for some reason, I was under the delusion 15 that when I indicated I had the morning, that I would 16 normally be in trial, that I would somehow get these 17 earlier in the morning. But in any event, counsel kindly did give me a couple hours to look at them and I did. 18 19 And both motions for reconsideration are 20 denied. 21 By way of explanation, I really would have 22 liked to have written something for you, but perhaps the 23 simplest manner -- the way to kind of handle this is just 24 for me, at this point, to go through and orally explain 25 why I'm denying reconsiderations from both you.

And I'm not really trying to engage in a conversation, counsel, just so you know. I'll -- I'll give you a sense of why these motions for reconsideration are being denied, and then we'll go forward with the trial.

And if I'm able, I'll follow up with something in writing, but at least you'll have some sort of a record as to why these motions for reconsideration are being denied.

With regard to the motion for reconsideration filed by Mr. Riddle, the -- one of the main concerns that Mr. Riddle has is with regard to the way the Court interprets the Right to Farm Act, and particularly -- essentially -- well, there were two issues, I think, really, that concerned Mr. Riddle that were raised here that the Court wants to respond to.

One is that the -- Mr. Riddle identified that the Court read the decision document to support a finding that the application materials made representations about odor control, and complained that the permit application itself is not part of the record.

And in any event -- and there seemed to be some concern that this was raised sua sponte by the Court. In fact, Mr. Lanser's pleadings raised this issue and pointed to the decision document as evidence of what was

in Mr. Riddle's application.

And the Court agrees that that decision document, as well as the testimony of Mr. Riddle, both reflect that his application materials referred to odor control.

Now, if, in fact, there's an issue of fact about that, it's true that there -- that there's nothing in the record, other than the decision document and Mr. Riddle's testimony, both of which indicate that odor control was part of the application materials.

If someone wanted to create an issue of fact by putting the actual permit application materials into the record, that wasn't done. In the record that the Court had, and has before it, was what -- what Mr. Lanser pointed to, which was the testimony of Mr. Riddle and the decision document, both of which indicate odor control being contemplated by Mr. Riddle's application.

So when the permit incorporated, by reference, the application materials, the Court found that odor control was then part of what was being incorporated. And I don't think the record had any issue of fact with regard to that.

It is true that the record didn't include permit application materials. Both sides, for whatever reason, I guess, didn't do that. But certainly the

1 decision document and the testimony of Mr. Riddle were 2 reflective of what was in those application materials. 3 Then the other concern raised by Mr. Riddle is the Right to Farm law. And Mr. Riddle feels that the 4 5 Court has essentially taken the borough permitting -- the 6 borough permit and kind of grafted that onto the Right to 7 Farm law. And that -- that's not what the Court was 8 9 The Right to Farm law talks about protecting a --10 an operation that is --11 MR. SATTERBERG: Your Honor, we have the 12 exclusionary rules invoked by the defendant or plaintiff. 13 THE COURT: Okay. 14 MR. SATTERBERG: And I understand there's a witness 15 in the courtroom. 16 THE COURT: All right. Anyone who's a witness here 17 needs to leave, please. We're going to bring in witnesses 18 as we need you. But --19 So the question is whether the land is used or 20 intend to use -- intend for use for the commercial 21 production of crops and livestock. And -- and if so, the 22 Right to Farm law would -- would be triggered. 23 The statute, interestingly enough, doesn't 24 indicate it. It doesn't indicate what happens when land

is used for different purposes. And there's -- the

25

statute seems to contemplate one purpose for land use only. And if there's -- if the land is used for this one purpose -- the commercial production of crops and livestock and activities along those lines -- it falls within the Right to Farm law.

Certainly the legislature must have been aware that land can -- could be used for different purposes.

And, in fact, many people use their land for various purposes. And -- but it didn't tell -- tell readers what to do when land is being used for more than one purpose.

So whether a purpose of -- a use of the land is commercial production of crops and livestock, if that then protects that land forever under the Right to Farm Act when, perhaps, another purpose has become the primary use, is a reasonable potential read.

And the way Mr. -- I think -- Riddle wants me to read it is as long as any of the land is used for -- at all for a commercial production of crops or livestock or the agricultural-type activities, in his mind, it is then protected under the Right to Farm Act.

And, you know, you could also read it that if it's used for anything else at all, it's not protected. I view what was intended by -- and if you look at the statute in its entirety and in it's whole, the intention was to continue to protect farms as long as they're still

primarily farms.

The intention was not to allow someone, for example, to continue to sell a dozen eggs and actually use their land for a nuclear power plant or something like that. They would not then be protected simply because they continued to sell a dozen eggs a year.

The question really is if it's still a farm, even if it grows and it becomes stinky, or it becomes loud or things like that, as long as it's still a farm and still being used for the agricultural purpose and commercial production of crops and livestock, it is protected.

And so given that, if Mr. Riddle's still primarily using his land for agricultural purposes, the fact that he may have something that's smelly or offensive to people around him that's still part of an agricultural purpose is really just too bad.

On the -- the flip side of that is if he's now no longer primarily using his land for the commercial production of crops and livestock and the other agricultural activities, then the fact that he may continue on the side to -- to do some farming is -- is really -- doesn't keep him protected by the Right to Farm Act.

And that's just looking at the statutory

language in its -- and the statutory purpose in its entirety.

So for those reasons, I deny Mr. Riddle's motion for reconsideration.

With regard to Mr. Lanser's, Mr. Lanser's document focuses on the issue of negligence and his concern that the Court took that away from this trial and granted summary judgment on that issue. And Mr. Lanser feels the Court overlooked the common law applicable to a duty and complained that the Court didn't go through an analysis of the foreseeability of harm test.

And I think it's true that the Court could have spent more time going through that analysis. But at the end of the day, once you -- once the Court concluded that Mr. Lanser -- that the harm that Mr. Lanser's alleging from odor -- odors is this issue of having it difficult to sell homes, and -- and then he decided, for whatever reason, not to quantify that in an economic term, it really doesn't matter because at this point he's not pursuing that harm.

That harm is the type of harm that has economic damage. And if you choose not to calculate the damage that's and pursue that, then I really think we're done.

And so at this point, Mr. Lanser has decided

		1647
1	IN THE SUPERIOR COURT FOR THE STATE OF ALASKA	
2	FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT	
3		
4	ERIC LANSER,	
5	Plaintiff,	
6	vs.	
7	ROBERT RIDDLE,	
8	Defendant.	
9	Case No. 4FA-11-03117 CI	
10	Supreme Court No. S-15780	
11	VOLUME VIII	
12	TRANSCRIPT OF TRIAL PROCEEDINGS	
13	July 18, 2013 - Pages 1647 through 1872	
14		
15		
16		
17		
18		
19		
20		
21		
22		
23		
24		
25		

1870 What would be the value of that? 1 Q. 2 Α. A couple thousand dollars. 3 Q. Okay. MR. SATTERBERG: Move the admission, Your Honor, of 4 5 CS, CQ, CP. 6 THE COURT: CS, CQ, CP. Any objection? 7 MS. ORAVEC: I -- I do object. I think these should have been brought on cross. But if I -- if Mr. Riddle 8 9 would just confirm they were actually paid, I have no 10 objection. 11 THE WITNESS: Two were paid and one wasn't. BY MR. SATTERBERG: 12 13 0. One was a donation? 14 One was a donation. Α. 15 MS. ORAVEC: Okay. No objection. 16 THE COURT: Admitted. 17 (Exhibits CS, CQ, and CP admitted.) MR. SATTERBERG: Judge, it's 1:29. Mr. Zimmerman's 18 19 here. So I think --20 THE COURT: Let's stop. 21 MR. SATTERBERG: It's time to quit. 22 THE COURT: Tomorrow morning at 8:30. We'll be done 23 tomorrow, yes? Or else we'll go into, like, September. 24 MR. SATTERBERG: I think we're going to -- I don't 25 know yet, Judge. I'm -- I've released one witness. We'll

		2316
1	IN THE SUPERIOR COURT FOR THE STATE OF ALASKA	
2	FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT	
3		
4	ERIC LANSER,	
5	Plaintiff,	
6	vs.	
7	ROBERT RIDDLE,	
8	Defendant.	
9	Case No. 4FA-11-03117 CI Supreme Court No. S-15780	
10		
11	VOLUME XI	
12	TRANSCRIPT OF TRIAL PROCEEDINGS	
13	September 13, 2013 - Pages 2316 through 2578	
14		
15		
16		
17		
18		
19		
20		
21		
22		
23	·	
24		
25		

		2317
1	1	
2	2	
3	3	
4	4	
5	5	
6	6	
7	7 TRANSCRIPT OF TRIAL P	ROCEEDINGS
8	BEFORE THE HONORABLE BETHANY S. HARBISON Superior Court Judge	
9		.
10 11	s	airbanks, Alaska eptember 13, 2013 :36 A.M.
12		
13		MEE ANDERSON ORAVEC
14	Or 41	avec Law Group, LLC 5 1st Avenue, Suite A irbanks, Alaska 99701
15	L5	LLIAM R. SATTERBERG, JR.
16	L6 WE	NDY M. DOXEY tterberg Law Offices
17	99 Fa	701709 4th Avenue irbanks, Alaska 99701
18	.8	
19		
20		
21		
22		
23		
24		
25	25	

1 in fact, I think Mr. MacInnis said it's a pretty good 2 process he's got going on. In fact, he complimented 3 Mr. Riddle on the quality of his operation, that this is 4 how it works. 5 I mean, he actually -- Mr. Riddle actually 6 received compliments from the director back then on the 7 quality of the operation that was going on out there, as 8 far as how he was handling the septage. 9 You have another question. I can tell. 10 THE COURT: I do. So I'm just -- I'm struggling 11 with how to interpret that the practice here, having 12 lagoons, whether or not it's incident to or in conjunction 13 with farming activities. 14 And if I believe that certainly some 15 legitimate agricultural activity may involve spreading 16 human septage -- there's testimony --17 MR. SATTERBERG: Sure, Judge. 18 THE COURT: -- in the record about that. 19 MR. SATTERBERG: No problem. 20 THE COURT: Let's suppose I also conclude that, in 21 this instance, the septage isn't being stored -- only some 22 of it may be being used for farming, and much of it is 23 being stored as part of a septage business, when -- when 24 is it incident to or in conjunction with activities? 25 Does all of the practice have to be incident

to or in conjunction with activities?

MR. SATTERBERG: I don't -- I don't think all of it does, Judge.

THE COURT: Or -- in other words, like, suppose that it was a farm and they needed, like, fuel? So they had their own little -- a lot of farms do. I've seen this. You know, like, they've got gas and they can pump their own fuel or something.

And what if it turns into a great big humongous gas station and the farm shrinks down to, like, your thousand -- I mean, Mrs. Gardener with her little acre could generate \$1,000 worth of stuff. And --

MR. SATTERBERG: Your Honor, technically --

THE COURT: When is the -- when is the activity incident to or in conjunction with the agriculture? And when does the other activity take over?

MR. SATTERBERG: The concept of principle use is something that the plaintiff has read into the law in this case, and perhaps is leading the Court down a path on this. That's not what the -- the Right to Farm Act talks about, that the principle use of the property must be for a farm. Now --

THE COURT: It's not in the statute. And I think I was the one who wrote it in --

MR. SATTERBERG: Okay.

THE COURT: -- in summary judgment. It's not in the statute. But when I was writing summary judgment, I couldn't find a way to reconcile -- and I'm really interested in both of you, because you're both very learned -- how to reconcile this statute, because clearly it wasn't the legislative intent to allow the other activity to be the primary activity, and farming to be an acre of land that happens to generate the \$1,000 that we've heard from about 5 or 10 witnesses.

MR. SATTERBERG: I think there's two answers.

THE COURT: And that's what I'm -- that's where this Court -- and I'm not hiding the ball from either of you.

This is where I'm struggling.

MR. SATTERBERG: Two answers. Number one, if you recall, Charlie Knight told us that "if you want the protections of the Right to Farm Act" -- he told Mr. Riddle this. "If you want it, you've got to have a farm plan, and it's got to be approved by the Division of Agriculture."

They make the decision, "Are you a farm? Do you fall within that? If you want the protections of this Act, you'd better be approved. You better have a farm plan, and you better be approved," which Mr. Riddle is.

THE COURT: Or you better be an agricultural facility, or a --